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HYPOTHETICAL BARGAINS: THE 
NORMATIVE STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION 
David Chamy* 
A construction company promises to indemnify the property owner 
"against all loss ... in any way connected with the performance of this 
contract."1 Must the construction company reimburse the property 
owner for the owner's liabilities to third parties, incurred as a result of 
the construction? 
After performing a tubal ligation, a physician tells his patient that "it 
[is] impossible for her ... to have any more children."2 Is the physician 
liable for breach of promise when the patient becomes pregnant again? 
A car rental contract extends insurance for accidents that occur 
when the car is driven by the lessee of the car or by his "immediate 
family, his employer, his employee ... or his partner."3 Does the policy 
cover an accident suffered while the car is being driven by a restaurant 
valet? 
A corporation's shareholder-employee is contractually obligated to 
sell his shares back to the corporation when he quits his job.4 Must the 
corporation disclose to the employee circumstances that indicate that the 
shares are much more valuable than the current buy-back price? 
In resolving these cases, some of our most distinguished jurists 
have adopted positions that are incorrect, perhaps even incoherent. 5 
They have, under the influence of modem contract theory, relied upon 
an analytic framework that is fundamentally flawed. 
To interpret contracts, lawyers ask: what would the parties have 
agreed to had they explicitly adverted to the issue? That is, the inter-
preter constructs a "hypothetical bargain": he determines how the 
parties would have bargained to treat the situation that has arisen had 
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. - Ed. Thanks to Phil Areeda, Lisa Bernstein, 
Lucian Bebchulc, Clark Byse, Bob Clark, Terry Fisher, Kathleen Flynn, Jerry Frog, Mort Hor-
witz, Louis Kaplow, Duncan Kennedy, Reinier Kraakman, Saul Levmore, Jerri Lynn-Scofield, 
Frank Michelman, Todd Rakoff, Arthur von Mehren, and Lloyd Weinreb. The Harvard Law 
School and the Olin Foundation Program in Law and Economics provided financial support. 
1. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 36, 442 
P.2d 641, 642, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 562 (1968). 
2. Garcia v. Von Micsky, 602 F.2d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1979). 
3. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 901 F.2d 765, 766 (9th Cir. 1990). 
4. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 
901 (1988). 
5. The jurists in question for the examples here are, respectively, Justice Traynor and Judges 
Oakes, Kozinski, and Easterbrook. The cases are analyzed in the course of the discussion below. 
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it been directly presented to them at the time they were forming the 
contract.6 
In particular, the hypothetical bargain framework is invoked to re-
solve two types of issues. First, courts use it to interpret "ambiguous" 
language; that is, to apply the language of a contract to a particular 
contingency which subsequently arises, "the court [] construe[s] the 
language ... so as to give effect to what would have been the intention 
and agreement of the parties had their attention been drawn to events 
as they actually were to occur."7 Second, courts use the rule as one of 
"construction": to supply "implied duties" in the face of a contin-
gency that no language in the contract addresses. For example, in 
construing the scope of the implied duty of good faith, courts ask 
whether the parties "would have agreed to proscribe the act later com-
plained of as a breach of the implied covenant of good faith - bad 
they thought to negotiate with respect to that matter."8 Similarly, 
"when supplying terms of an effective but incomplete contract a court 
properly picks those for which the parties probably would have bar-
gained, had they anticipated the problem."9 
Yet fundamental issues of method and justification remain un-
resolved. First, there is disagreement - and some confusion - about 
the ways in which the hypothetical bargain test should be applied. A 
simple example illustrates the range of issues. Consider the question 
whether to imply a good faith term in an employment contract. The 
6. By contracts, I refer generally to agreements that govern consensual transactions, includ-
ing the legally implied terms for transactions that are provided by corporate and commercial law, 
bankruptcy law, and tort. 
For scholarly use of the hypothetical bargain paradigm, see, e.g., Bebchuk, Limiting Contrac-
tual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. 
L. REv. 1820, 1824 (statement offramework), 1835-58 (analysis) (1989); Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN L. REv. 271, 271-79, 283-99 (1986) (hypothetical 
contract among venturers in a close corporation) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Cor· 
porations]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982) 
(hypothetical contract between investors and managers); Jackson & Scott, On the Nature of 
Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989) 
(bankruptcy); Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 210-11 (1989) 
(article 9 of the U.C.C.). 
Treatments, from an instrumental perspective, of some of the issues raised in the present 
article, can be found in Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the 
Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1703 (1989); Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, A 
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 
HARV. J.L. PUB. POLY. 639 (1989); Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: 
Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990). 
7. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. v. Sun Bank Natl. Assn., No. 87-3985 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 
25, 1987), available in Harcourt Brace Jovanovich schedule 13D (filed July 9, 1987) at 13. 
8. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (opinion by Chancellor 
Allen). 
9. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Weinstein, 781 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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adjudicator can construct the "hypothetical bargain" in many differ-
ent ways. He could ask: would this particular worker and firm have 
bargained for this term? Or he could ask: would workers and firms of 
this "type," however defined, generally bargain for such a term? The 
adjudicator then would have to decide how general or widespread the 
purported outcome must be before it is taken as authoritative: all 
transactions, most transactions, a preponderance of transactions? 
Similarly, the adjudicator must decide what characteristics to ascribe 
to hypothetical bargainers. Should one imagine the outcome for work-
ers and firms as currently informed? - or for workers and firms with 
all information that is now available to the adjudicator, even if the 
transactors do not have that information when they actually bargain? 
Should we take workers and firms with their extant preferences and 
modes of thinking, or should we posit some "ideally rational" worker 
or firm? Such questions as these complicate contract interpretation. 
Second, the difficulties in method arise from fundamental problems 
of justification. Why are we bound by obligations to which we did not 
assent explicitly, but only hypothetically? It is by no means clear that 
individuals should be bound to hypothetical - as contrasted to actual 
- contracts, or even that it is appropriate to call such hypothetical 
contracts "contracts" at all. 10 The autonomy- or rights-based argu-
ments for promissory obligation do not readily extend to merely hypo-
thetical agreements. 11 Nor is it clear - from a consequentialist 
perspective - that a rule implying obligations to which transactors 
"would have assented" generally will reduce, rather than increase, the 
costs of transacting.12 
I address these issues of method and justification here. My argu-
ment proceeds in four Parts. Part I defines the problem of interpreta-
tion more rigorously and identifies the methodological choices facing 
an interpreter. Part II presents the justifications for enforcing hypo-
thetical bargains. The argument proceeds from the three justificatory 
principles generally accepted for enforcing contracts: fostering indi-
10. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs. and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1403 (1985), and Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties. in PRINCIPALS AND 
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 59-71 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985), provide 
definitive critiques of the claim that the "hypothetical contract" among shareholders should have 
the binding force of actual - explicitly and consciously assented to - bargains. 
11. E.g., Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563, 574-79 (1980) (objection in 
context of hypothetical bargains in the law); see also Kronman, Comment on Dean Clark. 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1748, 1749-50 (1989); cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 150-59 
(1976) (objection as applied to Rawls' hypothetical contract constructed in the original position); 
Cohen, Democratic Equality, 99 ETHICS 727, 750-51 (1989) (same). 
12. E.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 6, at 101-07 (illustrating circumstances in which it 
would be inefficient to enforce the rules that parties would have chosen, but did not choose). 
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vidual autonomy, promoting fair allocation of social benefits, and min-
imizing the costs of transacting. Parts III and IV develop a method 
for constructing hypothetical bargains. 
The argument here amplifies the contract literature with respect to 
basic contract theory and its doctrinal applications. The argument ex-
tends and corrects the current understanding of contract theory in sev-
eral respects. First, it clarifies the role of liberal and communitarian 
argument in constructing interpretive conventions for contract. As 
currently understood among lawyers, the predominant noninstru-
mental theories of contract are in large measure indeterminate as to 
the question of default rules.13 Nonetheless, as I shall explain, these 
theories do have limited implications for the ground rules that govern 
interpretive conventions. The argument here, then, clarifies the role of 
noninstrumental theory in delimiting the conventions that the law can 
adopt. Second, having identified these basic limits, the argument dem-
onstrates that analysis of interpretive conventions should proceed, 
within these limits, on instrumental terms. While lawyer-economists 
have taken for granted that their mode of analysis illuminates ques-
tions of contract law, there is no reason that lawyers - or legal deci-
sionmakers - should defer to economists' presuppositions on the 
matter. My argument demonstrates that the small but growing body 
of instrumental analysis of contract conventions14 bears directly, as a 
normative matter, on formulation of legal rules and decision of partic-
ular legal controversies. 
More concretely, the analysis here makes recommendations with 
regard to substantive issues in contract interpretation. As Professor 
Avery Katz has argued, relative little formal work has addressed the 
questions of "what the ideal conventions of contract formation and 
interpretation should be."15 As Katz observes, analytic scholarly 
work has focused almost entirely on the optimal set of suppletive 
terms, particular for contract remedies, and excuse of mistake, impos-
sibility, and frustration of purpose. 16 In contrast, here I provide a 
framework for determining interpretive conventions.17 In particular, I 
address such sources of perplexity as the plain meaning and parole 
evidence rules, the neophyte rule, the contra proferendum rule, the 
13. For a demonstration of this point, see Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the 
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 516-28 (1989) (analyzing the work of Charles 
Fried and Randy Barnett). 
14. See supra note 6. 
15. Katz, supra note 6, at 222. 
16. Id. at 216-19. 
17. The framework is summarized schematically in the article's conclusion. 
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role of custom in interpreting agreements, and the proper scope of im-
plied duties of good faith and fair dealing. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
A. The Need for a Set of Default Rules 
The law must supply a set of background conditions to interpreta-
tion and enforcement of contracts - commonly referred to as "default 
rules." Without default rules, no contract could have legal effect. 
This is the case for two reasons. Most fundamentally, no text can 
completely specify its own means of interpretation. A contractual 
statement that purported to be such a complete specification would 
itself have to be interpreted by some set of rules of interpretation. If 
the text purported to supply those rules, then those rules would have 
to be interpreted, and so on, ad infinitum.18 Thus, the default rules 
must, at a minimum, contain a set of rules about how the language of 
contract is to be interpreted. 
Second, aside from this basic epistemological constraint, an impor-
tant set of practical constraints limits the completeness of contracts. 
In almost all transactions, it would be extremely costly to draft a con-
tract that purported explicitly to address the obligations of the parties 
for all conceivable future contingencies.19 As a practical matter, then, 
most contracts are quite incomplete. 20 The law supplies these missing 
terms.21 For example, the doctrines of mistake and impracticability 
add terms to address low-probability contingencies;22 so do doctrines 
18. Cf. Davidson, Belief and the Basis of Meaning, 27 SYNTHESE 309 (1974); Davidson, Rad-
ical Interpretation. 27 DIALECTICA 313 (1973). 
19. In practice, of course, drafters will choose language to a degree of specificity and a style 
of drafting that reflects the interpretive practices of courts and the costs of reaching more precise 
formulation. For that reason, the epistemological observation, while establishing the need for 
some set of interpretive rules, provides scant guidance regarding what those rules should be; the 
particular rules and drafting style can be understood in terms of the various costs of transacting 
and background social conventions about the use of language. 
20. Parties who act in an economically "rational" manner, for example, will not draft terms 
explicitly to address contingencies where they believe that the likelihood of the occurrence and 
its effect if it occurs are sufficiently small that it is not worthwhile to specify an applicable term. 
21. Note that the law supplies a term whenever the contract is silent on an issue. Even if the 
court "refuses" to supply a term that the parties have not provided, the effect of that is to stipu-
late a background term: in particular, a background term that specifies that, in cases where the 
contract is silent, no further term will be decided, and the court will then either throw the case 
out or try to decide the issue adverting only to express terms, as if any implied terms that the 
parties are arguing for did not exist. 
22. Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 121 (1984), 
provides the basic theoretical model of suppletive terms. In the context of mistake and impracti-
cability, use of the hypothetical bargain framework has led to analysis in terms of comparative 
ability to bear risk, as the parties presumably would explicitly allocate the risk, had they ad-
dressed the matter, to the one better able to bear it. See, e.g., Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. 
Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 278 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Westinghouse Blee. Corp. 
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that impose general duties, such as the duty of good faith.23 Correla-
tively, once the parties know that the law will supply the term, they 
take that into account when calculating the benefits of drafting an ex-
press term. Parties will not incur the costs of specifying the term if 
they suspect that courts will supply the appropriate term in any 
event.24 
B. The Hypothetical Bargain Standard 
The hypothetical bargains standard, then, is deployed to supply 
these suppletive rules of interpretation and construction. The hypo-
thetical bargain standard must be defined on two dimensions: general-
ity and idealization. 
Generality refers to the extent to which the adjudicator particular-
izes her formulation to the particular transactors whose dispute is 
before her - adjusting the formulation for particular transactors' 
judgments, preferences, perceptions and so forth. For example, the 
adjudicator deciding whether employment is at will might conduct a 
detailed investigation into the understandings of the particular worker 
and employer involved in the dispute. Alternatively, she might simply 
announce a construction of the hypothetical bargain based on a gener-
alization about all firms and workers and applicable to all such trans-
actions. 25 The rule is more general, the greater the number of 
transactions or transactional situations that it covers (alternatively, 
the more general, the less one needs to know about the parties to the 
dispute and about their transaction in order to decide what interpreta-
tion to apply.) 
A second dimension is the degree of idealization accomplished by 
the rule. By idealization, I mean the degree to which the interpreter 
Uranium Contracts Litigation, 517 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D. Va. 1981); cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. 
of Maryland v. City of Sheboygan Falls, 713 F.2d 1261, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983) (reconstruction of 
possible bargain to accomplish assignment of risk to better risk bearer as matter of contract 
interpretation). 
23. For a formulation of the hypothetical bargain framework in this context, see Katz v. Oak 
Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
24. Conversely, parties will draft more elaborate and complete terms if they fear that courts' 
approaches to interpretation and construction will lead them awry. For example, John 
Langbein's empirical comparison of American and European contract practices suggests that 
American contracts, for comparable transactions, tend to be more elaborate as a "defensive" 
response to more freewheeling American interpretive practices, especially those in which civil 
juries indulge. Langbein, Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complete Contracts, in 
THE CoMPLEX LoNG-TERM CoNTRACT (F. Nicklisch ed. 1987) (Heidelberger Kolloquiuus 
Technologie und Recht 1986). 
25. I mean to distinguish here the question of how general a rule is from whether the rule is 
based on what particular transactors want. A highly general rule may be what all transactors 
want or what none of them want; what makes it highly general is simply that it applies to a large 
number of cases independently of the many differences that might distinguish these cases. 
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constructs the bargain as it would be struck by idealized rather than 
real-world transactors. Most often, the idealizing adjudicator will at-
tribute to the idealized bargainers a greater degree of rationality, or 
access to more extensive information, than real-world transactors pos-
sess. For example, when interpreting an employment contract, the ad-
judicator might ask how a worker would bargain if that worker had all 
the information about labor markets available to a sophisticated econ-
omist; or if the worker had information about the firm equal to the 
information that the firm's managers had. 
Note that the two dimensions - generality and idealization - are 
logically independent. For example, lawyers can use a highly particu-
larized rule that is nonetheless highly idealizing: for example, to re-
solve each employment dispute a court confronted, the couri would 
conduct a distinctive hypothetical bargain inquiry, but would do so by 
imagining, for the situation of this worker and this employer, highly 
idealized bargainers - rational and well-informed. Conversely, the 
method can be highly generalized but not idealizing. For example, the 
court could adopt a single general hypothetical bargain construct for 
all workers and employers, but construct by reference to what the av-
erage worker and firm - with whatever their characteristic deficien-
cies in information, judgment, and bargaining skill - would agree on 
in bargaining about the matter.26 
Thus, to take paradigmatic statements, there are four approaches 
to hypothetical bargains along these dimensions: 
I: choose the best rule for this transaction type (general and 
idealizing); 
II: choose the rule that these particular parties most likely would 
have negotiated to (particular and nonidealizing); 
III: choose the rule that parties in this situation would have cho-
sen if they were rational and perfectly informed (particular and 
idealizing); 
IV: choose the rule that parties to this transaction type would 
most likely choose in the general run of situations (general and 
nonidealizing). 
A set of widely cited cases from the California commercial law 
exemplifies the conflicts among these approaches. In Pacific Gas and 
26. Many lawyers might think that a tendency to idealize is likely to be accompanied by a 
tendency to generalize: le., that the "ideally constructed" bargain is likely to be one that holds 
as the ideal over a wide range of transactions. But this depends on what the relevant bargaining 
ideal is: in particular, it depends on how much the "ideal" bargain varies with the characteristics 
of particular transactions. See infra Part III. 
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Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 21 the court had 
to interpret an indemnity clause.28 Justice Traynor's influential opin-
ion in the case offers two central propositions about how the court 
should resolve this problem: (a) the adjudicator's task is to discover 
the "intention of the parties"; and (b) the adjudicator discovers inten-
tion by considering "all credible evidence" relevant to what the parties 
meant. In short, the adjudicator should determine whether the de-
fendant was liable for damage to third parties by looking at all evi-
dence relevant to what these parties would have said had they 
explicitly addressed the issue. Under my framework, Traynor's ap-
proach is highly individualized - it focuses on the views of particular 
parties - and not idealized - it focuses on what the parties actually 
would have said, rather than what rational parties would have pro-
vided for. 
Traynor's approach comes in for sharp attack from Judge Kozin-
ski's recent opinion in Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life In-
surance Company. 29 Kozinski contends that courts should stick to 
standardized formulations of what key contract terms mean, without 
inquiry into the particular views that the parties would have taken of 
the contingency in dispute.30 In terms of my framework, Judge 
Kozinski's argument makes two points.31 First, he argues that Tray-
nor's approach is not generalizing enough: that it focuses too much 
attention on what the particular parties before the court would have 
said about a particular contingency.32 Second, Traynor's approach is 
not idealizing enough: courts should interpret standard terms in con-
tracts between "sophisticated" parties by determining how rational 
27. 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968). 
28. Under the clause, defendant promised "to perform work 'at [its] own risk and expense' 
and to 'indemnify' plaintiff 'against all loss, damage, expense and liability resulting from , • • 
injury to property, arising out of or in any way connected with the performance of this con· 
tract.'" 69 Cal. 2d at 36, 442 P.2d at 643, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 563. The issue before the court was 
whether the clause required defendant to indemnify plaintiff's liabilities for damage to third 
parties. 
29. 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988). 
30. In Trident Center, the clause at issue prohibited prepayment of a loan; the borrower 
contended that other clauses in the contract permitted the borrower to prepay the loan by 
defaulting. 
31. It should be noted that Judge Kozinski's opinion does not identify the questions of gener· 
ality or idealization specifically, and, indeed, might in some respects blur the distinction between 
them. 
32. If one side is willing to claim that the parties intended one thing but the agreement 
provides for another, the court must consider extrinsic evidence of possible ambiguity. If 
that evidence raises the specter of ambiguity where there was none before, the contract 
language is displaced and the intention of the parties must be divined from self-serving testi· 
mony offered by partisan witnesses .... 
847 F.2d at 569. 
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parties would have wished the contract formulation to be applied. 33 
Who is right, Justice Traynor or Judge Kozinski? It is questions 
such as these that the hypothetical bargain framework must resolve. 
II. HYPOTHETICAL BARGAINS: JUSTIFICATIONS AND METHODS 
OF CONSTRUCTION 
Contract lawyers generally understand contracts to be enforceable 
on one of three possible grounds. First, courts may enforce contracts 
on principles of autonomy. Legal enforcement of contract promotes 
individual freedom by giving people the power to bind themselves with 
others. 34 Enforcement of promises fosters the autonomy of transact-
ing parties by enabling them to bind themselves to cooperate with 
others. 
Second, courts may enforce contracts on what I would call princi-
ples of benefit or social reciprocity. On this view, courts should en-
force contracts to implement a conception of fair social arrangements. 
Michael Sandel provides an incisive statement of this general view: 
"With reciprocity . . . contracts bind not because they are willingly 
incurred but because (or in so far as) they tend to produce results that 
are fair .... On the ideal of reciprocity ... the contract approximates 
justice rather than confers it .... "35 
The simplest benefit-based view of contract would take the transac-
tors' consent to an exchange as conclusive evidence that the contract is 
fair and ought to be enforced. Clearly, this fairness-based conception 
of contract will produce practical outcomes - as to the enforceability 
of express contracts - indistinguishable from those commended by 
autonomy-based conceptions:36 each takes the fact of consent to be 
decisive of legal obligation. 37 
In modem contract law, however, benefit-based theories have been 
33. Kozinski is less explicit about this aspect of his critique, but he seems to think that courts 
should assume all parties to such loan agreements to be rational and well informed. See 847 F.2d 
at 569. 
34. A definitive modem exposition is C. FRIED, CoNTRAcr AS PROMISE 16-21 (1981). Bar-
nett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 269 (1986), provides an alternative 
formulation. 
35. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 107 (1982). Professor Atiyah 
develops the contrast in legal doctrine between autonomy- and benefit-based theories of contract 
in P. ATIYAH, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations. in EssAYS ON CoNTRAcr 10, 10-
30 (1986), and P. ATIYAH, The Liberal Theory of Contract, in id., at 121. 
36. See E. Posner, The Bargain Principle and the Fairness Principle in Contract Decisions: 
Michigan, 1900-1950 (Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics Discussion Paper 
No. 81) (1991) (analyzing this phenomenon in Michigan contract cases). 
37. As we shall see, however, these two conceptions may imply respectively different rules for 
hypothetical bargains. 
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distinguished by a more expansive conception of the inquiry that an 
adjudicator should make before upholding a transaction as fair. The 
adjudicator should decline to enforce, or should rewrite, contracts that 
would authorize one party to abuse its bargaining power or to exploit 
mistakes in fact or judgment by the other party. Put more affirma-
tively, the task of the adjudicator becomes to promote "solidarity"38 
or to enforce compliance with generally accepted social norms, 39 
rather than simply to enforce bargains that the parties have made. On 
this view, "hard deals bind less [than from the standpoint of auton-
omy], but on the other hand, the need for consent fades, and I may be 
obligated in virtue of benefits I do not want or dependencies beyond 
my control. "40 
Third, many lawyers contend that contracts should be enforced 
strictly on instrumental grounds. Under principles of efficiency, it is 
welfare-enhancing for parties to be able to bind themselves in the fu-
ture, and a rule for enforcing contracts accomplishes that. Contracts 
improve welfare because voluntary exchange presumptively enhances 
the welfare of both parties: the parties consent to the exchange only 
because each believes she will be better off after the exchange is con-
summated than before it.41 This is the premise of the vast contempo-
rary law-and-economics literature on contract enforcement; it has its 
roots in the vision of commercial law that developed in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.42 
In this Part, I employ these three conceptions to help explain why 
contracts should be interpreted by the hypothetical bargain standard, 
and to help specify which method should be used when courts apply 
the standard. This inquiry is a necessary first step in answering the 
question whether lawyers have available a coherent doctrinal frame-
work for interpretation. 
38. E.g., Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 644-46 (1983). 
39. In modem literature, Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 
(1974), is an exemplary analysis of the various relationships between contract law and back-
ground transactional norms. 
40. M. SANDEL, supra note 35, at 107. 
41. Three reasons that it enhances welfare to make enforceable commitments: risk-shifting, 
differences in access to information, and need to make "reliance investments." See Chamy, Non-
legal Sanctions in Commercial Transactions, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 398-99 (1990). For models 
of the gains from facilitating relationship-specific investments, see Goetz & Scott, Enforcing 
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, in 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1266-71 (1980); Hart 
& Holmstrom, The Theory of Contract, in ADVANCES IN EcONOMIC THEORY, 71, 129-30 (T, 
Bewley ed. 1987). 
42. See generally P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 292-358 
(1979). 
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A. Hypothetical Bargains as a Problem of Rights or Justice: 
Choice-Based (Autonomy) Theories 
1. Justification 
In autonomy-based contract theories, obligation arises from the ex-
press consent of the parties. The basis of obligation is the act of 
choice. In the first instance, then, a merely hypothetical agreement 
regarding a particular contingency - an agreement that the transac-
tors did not actually choose - does not display the necessary feature 
for obligation.43 
Nonetheless, the adjudicator can found the authority of hypotheti-
cal bargains in actual consent. Consider the adjudicator who must 
decide whether the employment contract between the parties stipu-
lates a prohibition against opportunistic or confiscatory firings. The 
contract contains no language that, by "ordinary language" principles 
of understanding, would address the matter. But this does not end the 
matter. For the adjudicator observes that words carry a wide range of 
connotations, adumbrations, "penumbrae," that can appropriately be 
taken as consented to by a party who utters the words, or signs the 
documents, that constitute the actual contract.44 The apparently si-
lent contract may nonetheless, in Cardozo's famous phrase, be "in-
stinct with an obligation."45 
The court that enforces the hypothetical bargain purports to inter-
pret the implications of the parties' own commitments to participate in 
fostering their own projects. What standard should the adjudicator 
use for interpreting the contract to construct the hypothetical bargain? 
Is there a method of interpretation that follows from the premises of 
liberal theory? 
The adjudicator's choice of a principle of interpretation depends 
on why she takes free choice as decisive.46 For example, the adjudica-
43. Clearly, this question is homologous to a closely related issue in social contract theory: 
why in the context of fundamental social arrangements a merely hypothetical agreement would 
be binding, or, more fundamentally, in what way it makes sense here even to speak of an "agree-
ment." For a recent discussion, see, e.g., Freeman, Reason and Agreement in Social Contract 
Views, 19 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 122 (1989) (analyzing views of Gauthier and Rawls). In both con-
texts, the inquiry must explain why the implied social contract is binding or (more usually) 
provide a theory about why imagining the contract is a useful heuristic device. 
44. See C. FRIED, supra note 34, at 85-91. 
45. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917). Lan-
guage carries with it a wide range of implicit connotative assumptions. It is taken to be situated 
in a complex set of conventions that constitute the expressive or referential power of even short 
simple phrases. Once this view of language is adopted, it would enhance autonomy, within the 
liberal conception, to enforce the intentions recognizable under more sophisticated theories of 
interpretation. It is wrong not to honor what the parties "would have agreed to" if that hypo-
thetical agreement is part of what the parties did agree to. 
46. The commitment to individual autonomy that traditionally goes by the name of liber-
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tor might think that free choice is good and agreements should be 
enforced because we value the discipline that it instills for people to 
think through their agreements, write them down, and stand by them. 
With this belief, the adjudicator would be reluctant to enforce merely 
hypothetical obligations, for such enforcement would dilute the disci-
plining effect of contracts.47 In contrast, the adjudicator who believed 
that the value of freedom of choice lay in the substantive good of con-
structing and going forward with cooperative projects would reach the 
opposite result: she would be willing to supply missing terms.48 To 
justify a particular mode of interpretation, the interpreter specifies 
how that interpretive method conforms to a particular conception of 
autonomy. 
In twentieth-century American contract theory, debate has crystal-
lized around two paradigmatic modes of analysis for resolving the 
problems of interpretation posed by autonomy-based theories of con-
tract. The one mode - the "formalist" - takes meanings as corre-
spondence to a code; the transactor who wishes his "meaning" to be 
treated as part of an arrangement must make sure that the correspond-
ing code formulation has been invoked. The adjudicator, correspond-
ingly, treats interpretation as a problem of decoding. He consults a 
rule - or constructs one, if no rule is "on the books" as a matter of 
alism may serve a range of social values. (1) The commitment to autonomy may serve the func· 
tion of warding off in categorical terms "rent-seeking" or oppressive conduct by powerful 
subgroups in society, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 7-18, 331-34 (1985); Shklar, The Liberalism of 
Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Rosenblum ed. 1989); (2) it may embody goods 
of self-actualization, social diversity, and independence from institutional constraint, e.g., N. RO-
SENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM 34-56 (1987), or of a culture of trade and moderated self-
interest, see A. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS (1980) ("civilizing" effect of 
engaging with diverse transactors in the market in cooperative projects); (3) it may follow from 
"a right" possessed by individuals; (4) it may be adopted to advance a utilitarian social policy, see 
P. ATIYAH, supra note 42, at 332-58; Grey, Langdel/'s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983) 
(suggesting an interpretation of nineteenth-century legal formalism in consequentialist terms); (5) 
rights may arise pragmatically, as a result of a general social consensus on the fair terms of 
cooperation that arises in tum from both fear of oppression and commitment to self-actualiza· 
tion, see Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 J. PHIL. PUB. AFFAIRS 223, 
248-51 (1985); Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 11 J. PHIL. 515, 518 (1980). 
47. More generally, the autonomy theorist who links the exercise of rights to conscious and 
articulated choice will be hostile to the enforcement of hypothetical bargains. One accomplish-
ment of Fuller's work was to establish that this extreme view of formality was not necessary to 
the institution of contract or a necessary implication of basic premises of autonomy. See Fuller, 
Consideration and Form, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-01, 811 (1941) (comparing grounds for 
formality with autonomy principle). 
48. If the adjudicator mistakenly imposes a term different from what the parties would have 
specified, then imposition of the term - not chosen by the transactors, and not even implicitly 
assented to by at least one of them - no longer appears to enhance the parties' pursuit of their 
particular project, or properly to discover and articulate meanings immanent in their prior words 
and conduct. Furthermore, if parties are mistaken, the adjudicator may decide that she best 
fosters autonomy - in helping the parties pursue their projects - by supplying not the terms 
that they would have chosen given their limited information, but the terms that seems best to the 
adjudicator in light of all of the information and advantages of the procedures available to her. 
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statute, common law precedent or trade custom - that states that 
"indemnification means ~· "; he then applies that rule of decoding or 
translation, regardless of any evidence of what the parties thought. 
Interpretive conventions are conceived simply as a type of code (or 
menu) for translating contractual statements into obligations of parties 
with reference to specific future contingencies.49 
This formalist interpreter's decisions are based on a claim of enti-
tlement or right. The transactor's compliance with conventional, es-
tablished rules of meaning entitles that transactor to recover. The 
formalist simply defines duty by reference to the relevant background 
conventions.· Holmes articulates this variant of the formalist claim in 
his brief article on the theory of contract interpretation:50 declining to 
enforce the conventionally accepted meaning "would run against a 
plain principle of justice. For each party to a contract has notice that 
the other will understand his words according to the usage of the nor-
mal speaker of English under the circumstances, and therefore cannot 
complain if his words are taken in that sense."51 One might say, that 
is, that each party has a duty to comply with the understandings of the 
"normal speaker of English under the circumstances."52 The reconcil-
iation of these parties' claims is then accomplished at the level of inter-
pretive convention. 
The alternative "contextualist'' mode of interpretation renders 
judgments by reference to conceptions of fault or desert. As Corbin 
formulates the problem, the question is whether the party was at fault 
for using the language as she did. 53 If not, she deserves to have her 
intent honored as she understood it, even if her understanding fails to 
comply with any generally cognizable code formulation. Language 
has a generative or context-specific aspect that resists reduction to 
code formulations. 54 
It is no accident that the problem of interpretation has been con-
ceived in this way. The conflict between these two models of interpre-
tation exemplifies what Lloyd Weinreb has depicted as the 
49. On this approach, there is no a priori reason for contract interpretation to conform to 
codes or understandings that govern other "language games." The transactors will simply learn, 
and apply, whatever code the legal system adopts as its system of interpretation, although the 
legal system should be guided in its choice of conventions by convenience, cost of learning, and 
so forth. 
50. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1899). 
51. Id. at 419. 
52. Id. 
53. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Paro/ Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161 
(1965). 
54. The jurisprudential import of this feature of language, and its tension with Holmesian 
positivism, is emphasized by Ross, TU-TU, 70 HARV. L. R.Ev. 812, 812-25 (1957). 
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"antinomic" structure of conceptions of justice. ss The antinomy arises 
from two inconsistent but equally powerful ways of interpreting the 
normative consequences of human action. In one view, rights are de-
termined by entitlement: application of a predictable rule system de-
termines the normative consequences - the rights and duties - of 
different modes of conduct. A "promise" creates obligations that are 
determined according to entirely conventional criteria. The structure 
of claims and benefits is fully determined by natural laws of causality 
and socially constructed laws that assign entitlements on the basis of 
actions and their consequences or outcomes. 
On the other view, justice requires that a person receive what he 
deserves. 
[S]omeone may resist application of a rule, without questioning that it is 
the rule and that the conditions for its applications are met. He may 
assert that its application would be unjust and, if asked to explain fur-
ther, is likely to say that the person affected by the rule does not deserve 
whatever are the consequences, beneficial or harmful, of its 
application. s6 
In contract law, the most familiar example of such a conception is the 
principle of promissory estoppel. In effect, the promisee who invokes 
the doctrine seeks an exception to the entitlements (or in her case the 
absence of entitlement) that the formal requirement of consideration 
dictates. The promisee must argue, although she has no entitlement 
under the contractual rule of consideration, that nonetheless justice 
requires that the promise be enforced.s7 Clearly, the conception of jus-
tice that the promisee invokes must be one that exempts her from the 
system of entitlements created by rule. Conceptions of desert are the 
strongest candidate. ss 
This conflict between notions of entitlement and desert appears, as 
SS. See generally L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JusncE 129-265 (1987). 
S6. Id. at 194. 
57. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, provides that "[a] promise which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee .•• and 
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). 
SB. Alternatively, in a few carefully specified circumstances, invocation of promissory estop-
pel might be justified on grounds of distributive justice. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 41, at 440-
41, 448. 
For a somewhat different formulation of the sources of the conflict between claims of entitle-
ment or right and desert, see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (offering a phenomenological account, which is extended in his 
recent papers, on the phenomenology of judging). Weinreb's discussion deepens common under-
standings substantially by establishing the connection between the formal antinomies in the ap-
plication of rules, and the antinomy within analytic conceptions of justice. The bearing to the 
present argument is direct, then, for the argument here similarly traces the conflict in the con-
struction of hypothetical bargains to this analytic conflict. A merely phenomenological account 
such as Kennedy's of course suffers the deficiency that it renounces the attempt by analytic 
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we have seen, when the court interprets a clearly enforceable contract. 
Neither the formalist nor the contextualist view enjoys theoretical 
dominance.59 For contract interpretation, particularly, the difficulties 
with each view are apparent. The formalist view, however appealing 
from the standpoint of analytic economy, founders on the inevitable 
incompleteness of formal "codes."60 Language is sufficiently unclear, 
and legal conventions about meaning sufficiently difficult to ascertain 
and learn to use, so that often we do not view individuals as blamewor-
thy when they fail to attain total clarity of meaning in the course of 
their engagements. If the interpreter cannot make the Holmesian 
move - which pretermits further inquiry into intention - then the 
contextualist may point, in some cases, to some further feature of her 
situation that relieves her of fault. Or, more affirmatively, this lets her 
continue to deserve to have the interpretation correspond to her in-
tent, as compliance with intent is the core moral principle at issue. 61 
An a priori insistence on the contextualist position is, however, 
equally unjustified. The mistake in such insistence is well illustrated 
by Justice Traynor's argument in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. W. 
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. 62 Justice Traynor argues that the con-
ception of intent, taken with a view of how language and mind work, 
means of those to convince those not willing to recognize that account as descriptive of their 
experience. 
To be sure, Corbin might have wished to situate his arguments about interpretation in the 
context of communitarian rather than liberal contract theory. In particular, Mort Horwitz sug-
gests in his forthcoming work on legal realism that Corbin's early writings (in the 1910s) employ 
the critique of contract formalism to further the larger social project of replacing the market with 
more solidaristic or progressive forms of social relationship. See infra section 11.B (communitar-
ian theory). Whatever Corbin's political conception, however, his work has powerfully influ-
enced liberal conceptions of contract. 
59. Indeed, the apparent subsistence of the two views throughout the law of contractual 
obligation confirms, I believe, Professor Weinreb's argument that the antinomy of these two 
conceptions is an inherent feature of our conceptions of justice. See L. WEINREB, supra note 55, 
at 221-22. As Professor Weinreb observes, in a society "that preserves large areas of life for 
private arrangements," entitlements created by the rules for transfer inevitably are based simply 
on those entitlements and not on the recipient's deserts. Id. at 217. 
60. Codes are most likely to be incomplete for cases that come before court. Cases are likely 
to be settled unless parties have different ex ante predictions of how the case will come out, see 
Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 404 (1984), 
which is more likely if the code is incomplete than if it is relatively complete. Further, if courts 
do not have conscious a policy of developing formal code, they are likely to generate, entropi-
cally, ever increasing diversity and complexity. 
61. Cf Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1107, 1107-12, 
1117-27 (1984) (describing law's move toward contextualist approach as development of general 
principles); Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Be-
tween Express and Implied Contract Terms. 13 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 306-09 (arguing that the law 
continues to be ambivalent between formalist and contextualist approaches). 
62. 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968). Justice Traynor's rendition of the 
problem adopts from Corbin an analysis that appears to make an epistemic claim for contextual-
ized interpretation based on reconstruction of meanings that the parties would recognize as their 
own. 
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implies a highly contextualized form of interpretation, one. that pro-
ceeds beyond the "literal" or apparent meaning of the document itself 
to look at the facts and circumstances under which the agreement was 
concluded. " 'A word ... has no ... meaning,' " argues Justice Tray-
nor, apart from " 'verbal context and surrounding circumstances and 
purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience of their 
users and their hearers or readers.' " 63 This argument conflates with-
out justification two different senses in which "context" is necessary to 
understand language. 64 To say something about what a statement 
means we must make some suppositions - substantial presuppositions 
- about the speaker.65 But to identify context in this sense does not 
require - as Traynor seems to think - that context so defined be 
determined in any particular way, by reference to any particular evi-
dence. 66 Both must be "interpreted" if they are to guide decision. 
And there is no epistemic or semantic reason to think that the judge 
has more direct insight into the meaning of statements made in negoti-
ation, of the thoughts of the parties, of internal memoranda, of trade 
customs, than she has into the meaning of the contractual language 
itself. Nothing about the necessary contexts that provide the basis for 
interpretation can tell one how far one should go in getting informa-
tion about that context. That verbal meaning requires a "context" 
does not imply that any particular type of evidence is needed establish 
intention. 67 
2. Methodology 
We can complete the specification of the autonomy theorist's 
methods of constructing hypothetical bargains by following through 
the consequences of the two interpretive paradigms identified above. 
On the one hand, theories of autonomy that embrace conventionalist 
63. 69 Cal. 2d at 38, 442 P.2d at 644, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 564 (emphasis added) (quoting Pearson 
v. State Social Welfare Bd., 54 Cal. 2d 184, 195, 353 P.2d 33, 39, 5 Cal. Rptr. 553, 559 (1960) 
and Corbin, supra note 53, at 187). 
64. Cf Minow & Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1602-06, 1625-39 (1990) 
(tracing an analogous multiplicity in the meanings of "context" in public law and moral 
discourse). 
65. For analytic demonstration of this point, see the sources cited supra note 18. 
66. Traynor's particular concern is that judges should not supply assumptions about context. 
The exercise of interpretive judgment inheres in the resolution of the contract dispute. The par· 
ties' "circumstances" no more offer themselves up to direct, unmediated apprehension than does 
the language of the contract itself. 
67. Traynor's approach reflects clearly the influence of Corbin's classic essay, Corbin, supra 
note 53; both Corbin and Traynor have, in tum, influenced the erosion of the rule in other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 
383, 393-94, 682 P.2d 388, 398-99 (1984); Admiral Builders Sav. & Loan Assn. v. South River 
Landing, Inc., 66 Md. App. 124, 126-32, 502 A.2d 1096, 1098-100 (1986); Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 
S.W.2d 177, 181-82 (Mo. App. 1979). 
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or code-oriented views of interpretation generally lead to principles of 
contract justification based simply on the policies to be served by a 
system of contract, without regard to claims of right or justice. Most 
often, the goal is simply to facilitate commercial transactions; that is, 
act-based theory endorses the instrumentalist goal, for contract, of re-
ducing the cost of transacting. 68 Other "principles of justice" are not 
in play: the adjudicator then simply would adopt the recommenda-
tions of economic analysis. 69 
On the other hand, the contextualist offers a set of principles that 
may diverge from norms of minimizing transaction costs. There are 
two reasons for this: one bears on the level of generality, the other on 
the degree of idealization, at which the adjudicator constructs hypo-
thetical bargains. 
Regarding generality, the contextualist may emphasize the result-
ing particularized fit with intuitions of the transactors whose disagree-
ment is the subject of adjudication. The contextualist emphasizes that 
a hypothetical bargain is authoritative because it is grounded on the 
understandings and practices of the particular persons to whom the 
interpretation is applied. Because contractual obligation is rooted in 
the articulated acceptance of obligation, those upon whom obligation 
is imposed must recognize the obligation as one that they would have 
adopted willingly. The interpretation "makes sense" of the parties' 
understanding better than any other interpretation. On this view, the 
interpreter - the judge in the contract case - should exercise situ-
ated judgment: he should make the interpretive judgments by using 
the methods, and applying them to the material, of the participants in 
the practice - the transactors - themselves.70 To construct the hy-
pothetical bargain, then, one should ask what stipulated term makes 
68. Cf Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 105, 105-06 (1989) (identifying convergence of what parties agree to and what 
rational parties would agree to). 
69. See infra section 111.C (application of transaction-costs framework). 
70. The conception of interpretive method that this entails has been most clearly articulated 
by commentators who understand the common law or, indeed, political deliberation more gener-
ally, as such an interpretive practice. Dworkin, for example, writes: "[The interpreter] under-
takes [interpretation when he] use[s] the methods his subjects use in forming their own opinions 
about what [the practice] requires. He must, that is,join the practice he proposes to understand 
.... " R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 64 (1986). What counts as interpretation is a more lucid 
explanation to the subjects of their own purposes and actions of what they themselves are doing. 
[H]uman behaviour seen as action of agents who desire and are moved, who have goals and 
aspirations, necessarily offers a purchase for descriptions in terms of meaning- what I have 
called "experiential meaning." The norm of explanation which it posits is one which 
"makes sense" of the behavior, which shows a coherence of meaning. This "making sense 
of" is the proffering of an interpretation .... 
c. TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 26 (1985) (formulation is in the context 
of an argument for interpretive "science," but the definition is presented as a more general defini-
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sense of the parties' project, as the parties themselves understand it? 
To use the colloquial phrase, the legal decisionmaker should appar-
ently try to put herself "in the shoes of the parties" at the time that 
they were making their transactional decisions. 71 
The premise of the paternalistic variant to autonomy-based con-
tract adjudication is that transactors may wrongly understand what 
terms they should consent to. The adjudicator can then enhance the 
transactors' autonomy to correct mistakes of judgment. For hypothet-
ical bargains, this means that the adjudicator reaches an understand-
ing of the bargain different from that the transactor would reach or 
even find convincing or comprehensible. A useful description of judg-
ment, in this regard, is provided by Hannah Arendt. 
[The process of judgment] does not blindly adopt the actual views of 
those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a 
different perspective; [it] is a question neither of empathy, as though I 
tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and join-
ing a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actu-
ally I am not. 12 
The paternalistic element of this approach is more explicit in the fol-
lowing example: 
Suppose I look at a specific slum dwelling and I perceive in this particu-
lar building the general notion which it does not exhibit directly, the 
notion of poverty and misery. I arrive at this notion by representing to 
myself how I would feel if I had to live there, that is, I try to think in the 
place of the slum-dweller. The judgment I shall come up with will by no 
means necessarily be the same as that of the inhabitants, whom time and 
hopelessness may have dulled to the outrage of their condition . . . . 
[W]hile I take into account others when judging, this does not mean that 
I conform my judgment to those of others .... 73 
tion of interpretive practice). For analysis of the use of this approach in construing statutes, see 
R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 203-06 (1990). 
As a foundational matter, it should be noted that contemporary liberals apparently agree 
generally on the authority of this method of interpretation for discovering normative principles. 
To take two liberal autonomy theorists with very different programmatic commitments: both 
Rawls and Epstein argue that their conception of political or legal norms derive from careful 
reflection upon generally accepted moral presuppositions built into our language and practices. 
Rawls appeals to the commitment in our political culture to fostering individual autonomy and 
self-respect, aspects of which are captured in the primary goods; Epstein appeals to the norms of 
responsibility for action reflected in everyday language and moral judgments. Where Rawls and 
Epstein differ, then, is in the interpretive inferences that they purport to draw. 
71. To the extent that the community of transactors shares a well-developed set of assump-
tions about what is reasonable for given transactions, the approach would seem to work quite 
well by consulting these accessible (in the community) assumptions. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-205 
(1986) (course of dealing and usage of trade). 
72. H. ARENDT, Truth and Politics, in BETWEEN PASf AND FUTURE 227, 241 (1968). That 
the autonomy theorist might adopt this conception of judgment does not imply that Arendt 
herself should be taken as an example of such a theorist. 
73. H. Arendt, Basic Moral Propositions (unpublished lecture at the University of Chicago) 
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For the autonomy theorist, the important structural feature of pa-
ternalism in constructing hypothetical bargains is that paternalism 
does not infringe upon the transactor's freedom to choose, as it would 
were the adjudicator making a decision that overrode the transactor's 
actual choice. The construction is hypothetical precisely because the 
transactor made no explicit prior choice. 
To take a simple example, consider the question whether an em-
ployer may fire an employee to avoid paying him a share of merger 
gains. The employment contract does not address the question, for the 
parties articulated no explicit term to cover the question. 74 The court 
imposes a duty to share merger gains on principles of hypothetical 
bargain that are paternalistic: the adjudicator asks what the "ideally 
rational" employee would have bargained for. 
If the contract is silent, the parties made no explicit choice on the 
issue. The principle of autonomy that requires courts to honor parties' 
choice is simply not in play: the parties made no choice. The adjudi-
cator should therefore consult other principles of autonomy. The 
court might conclude, for example, that principles of autonomy re-
quire fair sharing of gains and losses not allocated by prior agreement 
among the parties but plausibly attributable to their joint efforts. Or it 
might further autonomy to construct the arrangement for the parties 
that corresponds to what rational parties - parties attentive to and 
understanding of a rational life-plan - would have agreed to. 
The crucial point is that the principle of autonomy that requires 
adjudicators to honor parties' express commitments does not corre-
spondingly require courts to hew rigorously to what the parties would 
have done, if there is no express agreement. Rather, the adjudicator 
should proceed by consulting other principles of decision that are true 
to her conception of autonomy. 
To be sure, some principles of autonomy suggest that the adjudica-
tor hew closely to what the parties would have done. Consider, for 
example, an adjudicator who enforces express agreements because she 
believes that she should limit as much as possible her imposition of her 
own views of desirable social organization. She considers that enforc-
ing express agreements to resolve disputes usefully limits the scope of 
quoted in Beiner, Hannah Arendt on Judging, in HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S 
PoLmCAL PHILOSOPHY 89, 107-08 (Beiner ed. 1982) (emphasis added). 
74. Of course, what one treats as the explicit term itself depends upon the interpretive princi-
ples that the judges will employ. The antipaternalist will say that she will not impose an outcome 
that overrides express terms. For these purposes, one should determine whether the term is 
"express" by deciding whether it indicates a conscious decision of the parties about their duties 
under the contingency now at issue, for it is to the overriding of this choice that the antipaternal-
ist objects. 
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public power and thereby wards off tyrannical impositions among 
individuals. 
This adjudicator might contend that her principle also requires, in 
the absence of express agreement, that she try to reconstruct what 
these parties would have done to resolve the dispute. Like her rules 
about express agreements, such a rule would serve to limit her power. 
As a heuristic device, it would - if she could adhere to it rigor-
ously75- force her to resolve the dispute on principles that others (the 
transactors) would have chosen, rather on the principles that she her-
self prefers. In this way, her approach might appear to limit arbitrary 
exercises of power. 
But other reasons to value autonomy do not as readily suggest this 
particular approach to hypothetical agreements. Consider, for exam-
ple, the adjudicator who values autonomy because she considers that it 
serves an important disciplinary function to require persons to specify 
their arrangements and then live by them. This approach to auton-
omy would not lead the adjudicator to be sympathetic to careful re-
construction of the individual parties' choices for cases in which they 
were silent. Indeed, the adjudicator might be inclined to think that for 
her to "help the parties out in this way" might dilute the disciplinary 
force of her adherence to express agreements. She might then proceed 
by other hypothetical bargain rules - for example, she might assume 
that parties meant to reserve discretion on all issues on which their 
agreements were silent. 
Most clearly, an autonomy theorist holding to a strong principle of 
autonomy for situations where there is no express choice would not 
feel that she compromised her principles: in determining that no 
strong principle applied where no express choice had been made she 
would be following her principles rigorously. This is not a case of 
persons "forced to be free," in Rousseau's infamous phrase. The par-
ties are not being forced here, in the sense of having their express 
choice overridden; the hypothetical bargain question arises because 
there is no express choice. 
For hypothetical bargains, then, autonomy theorists do not neces-
sarily find it problematic to impose a bargain different from what these 
particular parties actually would have done, provided that doing so 
would enhance autonomy in this other respect. 76 The answer turns on 
why autonomy seems to be the relevant value. 
75. As Arendt suggests, some degree of idealization may inhere in the exercise of judgment, 
simply because it is impossible to enter fully into the thinking of another person. 
76. In other words, the autonomy theorist attaches less importance to fulfilling implicit ex-
pectations than to enforcing expressly chosen arrangements. 
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3. Conclusion 
The discussion has identified two basic approaches. On the one 
hand, the autonomy theorist may recommend that hypothetical bar-
gains be constructed simply to minimize transaction costs. He would 
do so if he considered that transactors could be expected to under-
stand and conform to the conventional standards established on the 
basis of transactions-costs criteria. 77 On the other hand, the autonomy 
theorist may recommend that the adjudicator depart from the transac-
tion costs analysis in two respects: this approach postulates a value of 
"fit" with transactors' expectations, and it may commend that adjudi-
cators should correct transactors' mistakes. 
B. Hypothetical Bargains Within Reciprocity-Based 
Theories of Contract 
1. Justification 
The role of hypothetical bargains here varies with the emphasis 
that the theorist places upon consent. Consider first the theorist who 
takes consent as conclusive, or at least strongly presumptive, evidence 
that the contract contemplates a fair exchange of benefits. On this 
view, the fact that the parties would have consented to a term seems to 
be strong evidence that the term is fair. The hypothetical bargain ex-
erts the same authority as an actual bargain. 78 The imagined or hypo-
thetical consent indicates the scope of benefits to be conferred. 79 Like 
the autonomy theorist, however, the benefit theorist who attaches pre-
sumptive value to consent must have a theory of interpretation that 
explains what the transactors have consented to. The questions that 
arise here, then, are in large measure those that we have analyzed for 
autonomy-based theories. 
For the adjudicator who works with a more complex conception of 
fairness, an account of the authority of the hypothetical bargain is cor-
respondingly more complex. An adjudicator who thought that abuse 
77. That is, the conventionalist autonomy theorist is unwilling to adjust conventions to help 
individuals who claim that they did not appreciate the consequences of the background conven-
tions for their transactions. 
78. An actual bargain would exert greater authority only because it is more convincing evi-
dence offairness than a mere hypothetical bargain - presumably, because the adjudicator may 
not have quite the confidence in her hypothesis about the outcome of bargaining that she would 
have in the actual bargain. 
79. In economic terms, the "expected value" of the payoff to each party over all expected 
contingencies - the (best possible) ex ante valuation of the benefits to be given ex post - should 
be equal for the two parties. Then, various contingencies should be treated so as to hold these 
benefits equal, under the hypothetical bargain formulation. This gives rise to great practical 
difficulty because one would have to value outcomes under every contingency, in theory, to de-
cide whether one has assessed the hypothetical bargain correctly. 
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of informational advantages or economic power was widespread 
would mitigate the influence of these factors by her methods for con-
structing hypothetical bargains, just as she does for her rules about 
interpreting and enforcing actual bargains. 
First, the adjudicator may construct hypothetical bargains that 
strongly idealize the participants - that assume the (desired) equality 
of knowledge and bargaining power. Most commonly, a communitar-
ian adjudicator would attempt to determine "what the parties would 
have agreed to" by consulting socially extant expectations of fairness 
or reasonableness. For example, these adjudicators frequently limit 
the employer's right to fire an at will employee by referring to "reason-
able expectations" of the worker. 80 The adjudicator defines these rea-
sonable expectations by reference to "community standards" or social 
understandings about appropriate conduct in the workplace.81 
Second, the communitarian adjudicator might also adopt the hypo-
thetical bargain framework to induce individuals to form preferences 
in a way that the adjudicator conceives to be rational. The adjudicator 
who constructs a "rational" hypothetical bargain - who attempts to 
discover forms of rationality or commitments that individuals had left 
unarticulated - may convince individuals to adopt or endorse values 
in their relationships that they would not otherwise have adopted, 82 or 
80. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 680, 765 P.2d 373, 387, 254 
Cal. Rptr. 211, 225 (1988); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 290-92, 301-04, 491 
A.2d 1257, 1260-62, 1266-68, affd. in part, revd. in part, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985). 
81. From one perspective, it might seem that the communitarian adjudicator who arrived at 
her communitarian stance by a conviction of the pervasive irrationality, stupidity, and false con-
sciousness of transactors might abandon the hypothetical bargain standard altogether. She 
would instead simply impose what she thought was best for transactors. But, to remain consis-
tent to her communitarian commitments, the adjudicator should adhere to the hypothetical bar-
gain standard rather than simply impose her own judgment. Indeed, the premises of 
contemporary communitarian thought would require her to do so. For the communitarian 
would consider that she determines what is best not from standards derived from some transcen-
dental perspective, but rather from the standards of some relevant community. In asking what 
transactional structure, that is, what allocation of risk for a given contingency, is fair, the com-
munitarian adjudicator asks, then, how the standards of the community that she takes as her 
guide - which may, of course, be some ideal community of other-regarding and rational social 
actors - would structure the transaction. In short, she conducts an inquiry into the hypotheti-
cal transactional structure or hypothetical bargain for that community. 
82. A conception of preference formation through adjudication is the most coherent, perhaps 
the only coherent, way of making sense of attempts to describe deliberation in law as a rhetorical 
process. For a development of this conception, see J.B. WHITE, Reading Law and Reading Liter-
ature: Law as Language, in HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE 
LAW 77, 91-100 (1985) [hereinafter HERACLES' Bow]. Indeed, the conception of governance by 
law as a process of persuasion rather than coercion can be traced to Plato, who, in the Statesman 
and the Laws, emphasized that the legal decisionmaker must "produce and maintain a general 
conviction that the laws are right and proper and just." Plato's point is that to extract the 
citizen's obedience to the law by mere coercion, however effective, is a wrong. See R. BUXTON, 
PERSUASION IN GREEK TRAGEDY 53-57 (1982). 
The alternative, epistemic view of rhetoric sees rhetoric as systematically antithetical to real-
ist, or more sweepingly nonrelativist, claims about truth. The best philosophical introduction is 
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enable them to discover their commitments to values that were some-
how latent in previous conduct or social ties. 83 Adjudication under 
the hypothetical bargain standard is thus a process of forming prefer-
ences, rather than simply following them. 84 
Third, conservative communitarian adjudicators might hold that 
the fit with ordinary expectations or embedded community values 
gives persuasiveness or legitimacy to legal judgments based on hypo-
thetical bargains. Enforcement of social norms via hypothetical bar-
gains provides an opportunity for individuals to voice their concerns in 
a familiar vocabulary instead of in the technical language of efficiency 
H. BLUMENBERG, Anthropologische Anniiherungen an die Rhetorik, in WIRKLICHKEITEN IN 
DENEN WIR LEBEN 104 (1981). In particular, some lawyers seek in this philosophical tradition a 
justification for treating all the truths upon which legal judgments are based as subject to change 
by community consensus. E.g., Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. RE.v. 869, 871-82 
(1988). The difficulty with this position - at least for present purposes - is that it confuses the 
dependence of our access to truth upon some "mere" conventions with the possibility that we can 
change the status of those truths, in any way we please, simply by agreeing to change the back-
ground conventions. To the contrary, it seems clear that the character of the natural world, and 
of human faculties, places limits, albeit poorly understood, on the conventional systems that 
persons can live by and, more clearly, on their capacity to change governing conventions at will. 
83. See C. TAYLOR, supra note 70, at 9-11, 91-115. 
84. On one account, see Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can 
Learn from Modem Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17-23, 23 n.90 (1989), the interaction be-
tween adjudication self-understandings and preferences can be understood by analogy to the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle. This principle is often thought to demonstrate that the inter-
vention of the observer affects the observed values for variables that define the position and 
momentum of subatomic particles. There is, however, substantial reason to doubt the coherence 
of the disturbance theory version of uncertainty relations in quantum mechanics. Compare, e.g., 
id. at 18 n.66 (describing Heisenberg's gamma-ray microscope thought experiment) with M. 
REDHEAD, INCOMPLETENESS, NONLOCALITY AND REALISM: A PROLEGOMENON TO THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 67-68 (1987) (Heisenberg's analysis of the gamma-ray mi-
croscope thought experiment assumes that one of the particles is nonquantal, which leads to 
contradiction); Brown & Redhead, A Critique of the Disturbance Theory of Indeterminacy in 
Quantum Mechanics, 11 FOUND. PHYSICS 1 (1981) (proof); see also, e.g., Bell, On the Problem of 
Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics, 38 REv. Moo. PHYSICS 447 (1966) (alternative inter-
pretations of uncertainty principle); Bell, Six Possible Worlds of Quantum Mechanics, in SPEAKA-
BLE AND UNSPEAKABLE IN QUANTUM MECHANICS 181 (1987) (same). 
More fundamentally, one might question the extent to which useful analogy can be drawn 
between legal reasoning and reasoning in the physical sciences. Quantum mechanics as now 
understood leaves inexplicit the conditions under which some indefinite or probabilistic eventual-
ities that characterize quantum systems are actualized at the level of an observer using a macro-
scopic ("ordinary" physics) apparatus. It is hard to see how a legal (or moral) system that must 
render judgment in concrete cases could live with an analogous indeterminacy. Indeed, one in-
terpretation of the quantum-mechanical ambiguity - Hugh Everett's many worlds interpreta-
tion - "wipes out the distinction between potentiality and actuality, which is central to decision 
making, to ethical choice and to all practical activity .... 'If such a theory were taken seriously it 
would hardly be possible to take anything else seriously.'" Shimony, Conceptual Foundations of 
Quantum Mechanics, in THE NEW PHYSICS 373, 393 (P. Davies ed. 1989) (quoting Bell). And 
Niels Bohr's more generally accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics - which simply 
posits that the paradoxes of quantum mechanics reflect inherent limitations on the scope of 
human knowledge - would, if applied to ethical choice, similarly seem to posit the impossibility 
of making a set of ethical (or legal} judgments that cohered in any systematic way. Bohr's papers 
are collected in QUANTUM THEORY AND MEASUREMENT (J. Wheeler & W. Zurek eds. 1983). 
On these tentative grounds, I shall not further pursue, in the present Article, the implications 
of Tribe's formulation for contract adjudication. 
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analysis. 85 It thus provides for meaningful participation, rather than 
decision on the basis of technical and sometimes obscure criteria. Fur-
ther, it assures that these claims will not be denigrated by a mere tech-
nocratic calculation of variables. Adjudicators should, on this view, 
employ a heuristic - reconstructing reasonable expectations - that 
result in decisions readily transparent or apprehensible to particular 
transactors. 
2. Methodology 
The basic structure of hypothetical bargain analysis follows readily 
from these considerations. Again, let us begin with the question of 
how general the hypothetical contract inquiry should be. If the hypo-
thetical contract inquiry is designed to discover what the parties would 
have considered to be a fair conception of benefit, then the degree of 
generality should be determined by how much a perception of fair ex-
change varies among individuals. If individuals' preferences differ re-
garding the various contingencies at issue or their conceptions of what 
would constitute a fair exchange differ, then the hypothetical bargain 
should be tailored to those differences. In this way, even more 
strongly than the autonomy conception, the benefit-based conception 
would endorse a mode of interpretation that emphasizes the particu-
larized interpretation of transactors' expectations and understandings. 
Greater degrees of generality or ideality, conversely, would be jus-
tified by appeal to social rather than individual consensus about the 
definition of benefit or a just arrangement: this view questions the 
existence, rationality, or legitimacy of variations among individual 
transactors in their perceptions of the value of benefits exchanged 
under various contingencies. Three types of considerations arise. 
First, an adjudicator applying considerations of benefit might conclude 
that there was general social consensus about how various types of 
transactions should be structured, so that there was little need for in-
quiry into variations of perceptions or preferences among individual 
transactors. 86 Second, the adjudicator might believe that variations in 
judgments were misguided - that individual transactors differed in 
what they imagined would be provided for under various contingen-
cies because they wrongly appreciated what would constitute a fair ex-
change of benefits. Workers, for example, might not realize that they 
should not consent to be fired at will, either because they underesti-
SS. See J.B. WHITE, Fact, Fiction, and Value in Historical Narrative: Gibbon's Roads of 
Rome in HERACLES' Bow, supra note 82, at 139, 151-59. 
86. See generally Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 
ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 139, 151-95. 
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mate the costs that this would impose on them or because they misap-
prehend the importance of the term to employers. Or, conversely, 
employers might be overly generous with workers because they find it 
appealing or convenient to pacify workers in this way.87 Third, a ben-
efit theorist might note that differences in preference reflect "illegiti-
mate" positions in social hierarchy. Constructing hypothetical 
bargains to ignore these would be an indirect way to correct for these 
differences (a version offalse consciousness arguments). The adjudica-
tor's independent determination, or general consultation of social val-
ues, would be more rational. 
3. Conclusion 
Conceptions of fairness, like those of autonomy, accommodate a 
range of methods for constructing hypothetical bargains. The fairness 
theorist could simply endorse the use of the transactions-costs frame-
work for constructing hypothetical bargains. The theorist would do so 
if she assented to two premises: (1) the transactors' assent provides 
conclusive evidence of a transaction's fairness; and (2) the transactors 
assented to the entire set of conventional background terms com-
mended by a transactions-costs analysis. 88 Contract lawyers commit-
ted to fairness theories, however, are unlikely to accept either of these 
premises. 
Instead, theories of fair exchange suggest two modifications to in-
strumentalist theories. First, the adjudicator who constructs hypo-
thetical bargains should see an affirmative value in reaching results 
that conform to transactors' reasonable expectations. It is a good to 
confirm the authority of individuals' communally shared attachments 
and understandings. Second, the adjudicator should idealize the con-
struction of hypothetical bargains by conforming the terms of the con-
tract to arrangements that ideally rational transactors would view as 
fair. 89 
87. Cf. Williamson, Comment, in CoRPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CoNSEQUENCES 
61, 64-66 (A. Auerbach ed. 1988) (On one formulation, employers' payment of supra-market 
wages is a way of sharing oligopoly gains: employers purchase employee placidity). 
88. Also, a communitarian might conclude that her goals regarding fair social arrangements 
could not be advanced through regulation of consensual transactions, so that minimizing trans-
action costs is the only relevant social goal. This is unlikely without further analysis of the sort 
described in Part III. 
89. The adjudicator might affirm these goals even though the resulting hypothetical bargains 
raised the cost of transacting. For example, an elaborate judicial inquiry into the individual 
expectations of every fired worker would impose enormous costs on the employment relation-
ship. J. Dertouzous, E. Holland & P. Ebner, The Legal and Economic Consequences of Wrong-
ful Termination, ix (1988) (study conducted for the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND 
Corporation) (estimating annual cost of wrongful termination suits). While workers might not 
wish to bear the costs in the form of reduced wages - and, in that sense, it is clearly inefficient to 
1840 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1815 
A clear conflict exists between these two strands of fairness-ori-
ented theory. One might say that conservative communitarians differ 
from radical ones by their relative emphasis on deference to extant 
communal understandings rather than those reconstructed in terms of 
some stipulated social ideal.90 Communitarian lawyers tend to resolve 
the conflict between the two principles with a case-by-case assessment 
of the parties' rationality, equality of bargaining power, and the like. 
Either principle, however, may in theory demand outcomes different 
from those commended by an analysis based on transaction costs or on 
conventionalist autonomy theories. 
C. Instrumental Grounds for Enforcing Hypothetical Bargains 
1. Justification for Enforcing Hypothetical Bargains 
The interpreter guided strictly by instrumental considerations91 
would enforce hypothetical bargains because to do so reduces the costs 
of forming contracts. It is useful to begin the analysis with a simple 
pair of assumptions: transactors and adjudicators are ideally rational, 
and adjudication is costless. That is, the only costs that transactors 
face in forming contracts is the cost of finding a transacting partner 
and of specifying contract terms. Adjudicators accurately will fill con-
tractual blanks with the terms that the parties would have bargained 
for. On these simple assumptions, transactors would not have to write 
down any terms at all.92 Transactors would know that the law en-
forces whatever terms that transactors would specify; consequently, 
transactors need not actually incur these costs to get the benefits of the 
term. The adjudicator will enforce the same terms whether the trans-
impose them - the communitarian theorist might nonetheless persist in reading these terms into 
the hypothetical contract: the theorist might claim that these suits vindicate workers' fair expec· 
tations, regardless of their actual bargaining behavior, and that the workers' unwillingness to 
bear these costs is irrational or manifests "false consciousness." 
90. Compare, e.g., Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND 
OTHER EssAYS 1 (1962) with J, HABERMAS, LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNC· 
TIONALIST REASON 153-98, 374-4-04 (T. McCarthy trans. 1987). 
91. Again, recall the basic conception set forth in the introduction to this Part. 
92. They would simply have to take some action (say, shake hands) to identify their transac-
tional partner. In the law, the set of rules closest to this paradigm is the sale of goods under 
article 2 of the UCC. If two individuals identify a good that they intend to sell (for less than 
$500) and indicate their agreement to the sale, the UCC specifies, or authorizes the court to 
provide, virtually all of the remaining terms, including such matters as price, time and place of 
delivery, and damages for breach. 
Some readers have asked why, if we are willing to go this far, we would not go even farther 
and permit courts not only to fill in all available terms, but also to match up transacting partners. 
In some circumstances, of course, the law does precisely that, see generally Levmore, Explaining 
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REv. 65 (1985); but in general the law is much less willing to create 
transactions hypothetically than it is hypothetically to specify obligations for extant contractual 
relationships. Levmore persuasively identifies the reasons for this greater reluctance. 
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actors draft a contract that includes those terms or not. The hypothet-
ical bargain standard thus would sharply reduce the cost of 
transacting. 
Adjudication costs complicate the analysis. The adjudicator who 
aims to minimize the total social costs of transacting will consider two 
effects of imposing a hypothetical term. Formulating the term will 
save the parties the costs of doing so, 93 but it also incurs costs - spe-
cifically, the adjudicator's costs of imposing the term. It may be 
cheaper for the parties to incur the costs of formulating the term than 
for the court to do so ex post. For example, determining the proper 
term ex post might involve costly factual inquiries that could be obvi-
ated by the parties' disclosures when they negotiated the appropriate 
term.94 Thus, with imperfectly informed transactors the adjudicator 
must consider the effect of rules on incentives to discover or reveal 
information. 9s 
In corporate and commercial law, lawyers have tended to assume 
in applying the hypothetical bargain paradigm that all rational buyers 
and sellers, debtors and creditors, and so on, will bargain to the same 
terms.96 This is quite convenient, because one then can identify unam-
biguously what term the court should supply - the term that all of 
the parties would bargain for. The adjudicator then would save the 
parties the costs of negotiating the term in each contract, once the 
transactors understand that the law will provide the term for them. 
93. These costs are (1) costs of specifying terms; (2) losses from forgoing transactions for 
which minimally acceptable agreements cannot be drafted or enforced; (3) costs from suboptimal 
conduct, by one party during the course of the contract, that is permitted because it was impossi-
ble to draft a contract provision that would prevent it; (4) costs from litigation when disputes 
arise over the import of contract terms. For a typology and discussion, see, e.g., Ellickson, The 
Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism," 99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989). 
The second type of cost, forgoing transactions, requires further explanation. The parties may 
decide not to transact at all if they cannot specify a set of contract terms that appropriately create 
incentives or assign risks for contingencies that might arise as the transaction proceeds. If the 
parties decide not to transact at all, then the resulting social loss is the lost benefit that the parties 
jointly could have derived from the transaction if acceptable terms could have been drafted. 
94. An additional problem here is the externality that results because the public bears some 
costs of adjudication, whereas parties bear the costs of private negotiation. 
95. For example, if courts often fill in, this may save parties transactions costs but incur large 
costs ex post. If courts always fill in one way, this may reduce information costs by encouraging 
parties to bargain or reveal information if they want a different outcome. Ayres & Gertner, supra 
note 6; Bebchuk, supra note 6; Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, supra note 6; and Shaven, supra 
note 22, analyze examples of this phenomenon, such as disclosure of material information and 
disclosure of consequential or special damages. 
96. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra note 6, at 283 n.36 ("the si-
lence in the explicit contracts itself poses a problem of contract - the parties could solve it if 
they wished and were willing to bear the costs of transacting, and until they do, it is better to 
select the legal rule that promotes the joint wealth of the parties than to select a legal rule that 
defeats this (anticipated) preference"); id. at 298 ("[t]he right inquiry is always what the parties 
would have contracted for had transactions costs been zero"). 
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Legal decisionmakers save transactors some of the costs of transacting 
by reducing fees to lawyers, brokers and investment bankers.97 
Justifying the hypothetical bargain is more complex when the ad-
judicator will enforce a hypothetical bargain against transactors, some 
of whom might have bargained to a different term had they done so 
explicitly, that is, if some transactors are made better off under one 
formulation of the hypothetical bargain, but other transactors are bet-
ter off under a different formulation. To take a relatively simple exam-
ple, consider the case in which there are two possible rules and the 
costs of bargaining around each rule are the same. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that courts must choose between "at will" and "good cause" as 
the standard for firing workers. Suppose further that eighty percent of 
worker-firm contracts would, if explicitly bargained, contain the at 
will rule; twenty percent would contain the good cause standard. The 
cost of specifying "at will" if the governing law presumes "good 
cause" equals the cost of specifying "good cause" if the governing rule 
presumes "at will." In that case, obviously, the decisionmaker should 
choose the rule that the parties would choose in most transactions, 
letting transactors in the minority of transactions who have different 
preferences specify their preferred alternative. 
But minimizing the number of transactions in which parties bar-
gain around the rule will not always minimize the cost of transacting. 
One must consider the costs that would be incurred from each possible 
specification of the term.98 Suppose, for example, that it is ten times 
more costly for workers to specify a contractual good cause provision, 
with a background at will rule, than for workers to specify a contrac-
tual at will rule, when the background legal regime specifies good 
cause.99 Then the adjudicator should choose the good cause rule: it 
minimizes the net costs of transacting for firms and workers. Gener-
ally, then, the legal decisionmaker should choose a term that would 
actually be desired in relatively few transactions if it is much cheaper 
to bargain around that term than it would be for the few parties who 
want that term to bargain for it (or to submit to the terms that others 
want or to not transact).100 
97. Even when parties differ, they still may be situated so that all parties are at least as well 
off after the hypothetical bargain rule is adopted. 
98. For this example, I put aside litigation costs. 
99. An "at will" opt out might be a single sentence in a contract whose meaning can be easily 
assessed, while "good cause" might only be plausible if it carries with it a relatively complex and 
detailed set of contractual specifications that individual workers can assess only at great cost. 
100. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1395, 1413 n.69 (1989), provides an example of redistributive consequences in choice of corpo-
rate law rules. 
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But the value of the resulting cost savings is quite controversial. 
The adjudicator saves costs for some transactors by imposing an unde-
sired term on other transactors. Why should some transactors benefit 
at the expense of others? 
A welfarist might compare utilities among individuals to make 
some general estimate of social good accomplished by alternative 
rules. The taboo against direct comparisons of utility among individu-
als by policymakers has tended to discourage explicit use of this ap-
proach. IOI Unfortunately, the most common alternative approach to 
justification - what one might call the "Rawlsian"I02 construction of 
hypothetical bargains - is incoherent; it both requires and endorses 
the interpersonal utility comparisons that it purportedly avoids. 
The Rawlsian approach imagines the universe of potential transac-
tors choosing rules when placed behind a "veil of ignorance": transac-
tors do not know what they will know when actually transacting, 
particularly not whether they will be buyers or sellers, endowed with a 
certain set of resources and so on, yet possessing certain basic facts 
about preferences and human nature. The correct rules are the ones 
that transactors so situated would unanimously adopt.103 For exam-
ple, to construct rules for allocating benefits among shareholders, one 
might place all shareholders behind a veil of ignorance - not letting 
the shareholders know, in particular, which corporations or types of 
stocks they would have invested in - and ask what rules the share-
holders would choose about allocation of benefits from corporate 
action. 
For the hypothetical bargain as a standard of legal decisionmak-
ing, this Rawlsian formulation amounts to no more than a way of 
cloaking the taboo comparison of interpersonal utilities or distributive 
101. On the function of such taboos, see Clark, supra note 6, at 1737. The "taboo" character 
of the intellectual ban against direct interpersonal utility comparison is particularly striking both 
because such comparisons would seem to be a common and perhaps necessary feature of ordi-
nary human life, see, e.g., Davidson, Belief and the Basis of Meaning, supra note 18 (arguing that 
such comparisons are intrinsic in our acknowledgement that there are other "persons"), and, as I 
suggest below, implicit in the alternative forms of argument that are used to circumvent the 
making of such comparisons. 
102. I hasten to add here that I do not consider "Rawlsian" an appropriate label, though it is 
so commonly used that I acquiesce in it. As I explain below, this approach borrows an analytic 
device from Rawls' work - the veil of ignorance. But, as a justificatory matter, its use is not a 
consequence of Rawls' analysis and indeed may be inconsistent with it. In any event, this 
method of aggregating preferences is presented from an instrumental perspective in Harsanyi, 
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. 
EcoN. 309 (1955). 
103. See, e.g., Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 
Mo. L. REV. 869, 875-77 (1990) (imagining "that all the potential clients in the world are assem-
bled behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance to select the rules that would govern the initiation and 
conduct of litigation") (footnote omitted). 
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outcomes with a more acceptable appearance of apparent unanimity 
among transactors. To be sure, it might appear that the Rawlsian 
need not decide that the winner's gain from a rule outweighs the 
loser's loss; she instead purports to ask the transactors themselves to 
make this determination by asking them to choose rules from behind a 
veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing, at the time of deci-
sion, whether they will be winners or losers.104 But one cannot imag-
ine what goes on behind a veil of ignorance without engaging in a form 
of interpersonal utility comparison, albeit recast by the device of the 
veil of ignorance in an "intrapersonal" form. A utilitarian who makes 
interpersonal comparisons based on "cost" and the Rawlsian con-
structivist always will arrive at the same rules, provided that the utili-
tarian is willing to use ex ante notions of cost that include risk 
aversion, and, more generally, to apply the same assumptions about 
human desires and preferences. 
In some circumstances, a third approach - aside from the direct 
comparison of utilities and its illicit Rawlsian variant - is available. 
In this third approach, the Rawlsian device serves to enable the deci-
sionmaker to make a decision that satisfies welfarist criteria of cost-
minimization. This occurs when (1) the total costs imposed upon all 
transactors affects the level of transactional activity, and (2) a higher 
level of transactional activity increases the social good. That is, the 
level of activity provides a proxy for the social welfare function that 
otherwise would be implicit in the decisionmaker's comparison of the 
different transactors' welfare as she decided which rule to favor. 105 
2. Methodology (Degrees of Generality and Idealization) 
The previous discussion has made clear how to approach the level 
of generality at which the hypothetical bargain is formulated. The ad-
judicator chooses the level of generality that minimizes costs. The de-
gree to which the adjudicator "idealizes" in constructing the 
hypothetical bargain will vary with her assessment both of the bar-
gaining behavior of transactors and of the costs and benefits of her 
constructing an "ideal" rule. 
Consider two contrasting "pure" transaction types. In transaction 
type (1), contractors consciously advert to the rules. If the court 
104. Also, the "Rawlsian" construction leaves unsolved the general and vexing problem of 
what the individuals behind the veil of ignorance are supposed to know or not know about their 
status in cases in which the rules that they choose are to be applied. 
105. The securities markets provide a convenient example. Rules that reduce the total vari· 
ance of market securities may increase the total level of investment by increasing return to share-
holders. The increase in investment, it seems fair to presume, accomplishes social good. 
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chooses a rule different from what the contractors would have chosen, 
the parties will write a provision trumping the rule or simply will not 
transact. The type of costs the court should consider are the costs of 
transacting the rule.106 In this circumstance, clearly, the proper rule is 
the one that the parties would actually have chosen had they con-
sented to the matter. 
In transaction type (2), contractors do not consciously advert to 
the rule, or, if they do, they accept whatever rule the law imposes. In 
this circumstance, the only relevant costs in choosing a default rule are 
the ex post costs of permitting inefficient (opportunistic or rent-seek-
ing) conduct. The court can be "patemalistic,"107 in the sense that the 
court may simply choose the rule that it considers best for the 
parties.1os 
The paternalistic construction of hypothetical bargains, if it is to be 
justified on efficient-transacting grounds, must assume that persons 
will not incur the costs to bargain around a rule that is best for them, 
or, more generally, that they will not as a result of the rule change 
their behavior in ways that reduce social welfare. If transactors are 
poorly informed, but vigorous - a feature that perhaps characterizes 
advanced capitalist societies - this assumption may not hold. 
Suppose, for example, that elite decisionmakers determined after 
elaborate comparative study that a certain composition of the board of 
directors was best for shareholders in the long run: the board should 
contain only outsiders (except for the CEO), and should include sub-
stantial representation of workers, creditors, and other so-called 
"stakeholders."109 The elite decisionmakers mandate their preferred 
106. I shall use the term "transacting around" to refer to the sum of the costs of opting out of 
the judicial rule and the costs incurred by not transacting. 
107. In using "paternalistic" in this sense, I adopt the usage of Clark, supra note 6, at 1723, 
and Kennedy, Redistributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Mo. L. REv. 563, 603 
(1983). Note that "paternalism" here does not connote overriding preferences expressed by the 
parties in the particular transaction at issue, though it may involve ignoring their general 
preferences. 
108. One way to understand this approach is to say that the best rule is also the one most 
likely to satisfy the criteria for efficient transacting set forth above: the best rule is the one that 
parties are most likely to want; let the few who do not want that rule bargain around it. 
It is sometimes thought that hypothetical bargains, to be binding, must be welfare-enhancing 
for the parties "by definition." See K.ronman, supra note 11, at 1750-51. As the discussion in 
text explains, this view is imprecise, at least if it is taken to mean that the instrumentally con-
structed hypothetical bargain will inevitably be one that enhances the welfare of the particular 
parties who are held to be bound to it, compared to any other stipulations that they might have 
entered into. 
109. To make the basic argument in simple terms, I am using a somewhat extreme example 
- a rule that would clearly spark widespread dissent and that lots of investors would care about. 
In contrast, the scope for "paternalism" - i.e., hypothetical bargains under which deci-
sionmakers simply chose the rule they like best - may be much greater with rules about which 
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composition, but provide for an elaborate and costly process of opt out 
by charter amendment. Suppose further that most shareholders do 
not share the elite decisionmakers' belief, but instead prefer a more 
conventional board. In these circumstances, most corporations will 
incur the costs of opting out, for those who do not will see their share 
values drop. The net result of the paternalistic hypothetical bargain 
under this scenario will be an increase in the transactions costs of 
drafting corporate charters. 
What if the wise elite, foreseeing this outcome, makes the require-
ments for board composition nonwaivable? Shareholders who now see 
corporations with these newfangled boards as less desirable invest-
ments will search, at the margin, for alternative investments110 in for-
eign corporations not subject to these restrictions, in partnerships and 
other investment vehicles, and so on.111 Further, one can foresee vari-
ous indirect transaction costs incurred to evade the rule - enterprises 
may reincorporate abroad or form as partnerships; 112 there may be 
litigation about how the corporation can comply with the new man-
date but still appoint the directors that the managers want; hordes of 
angry investment bankers may guillotine SEC commissioners on the 
Washington Mall; and so forth. 
The basic point is that transactors' conduct sharply limits the ex-
tent that an elite can be paternalistic in any consensual transaction 
involving sophisticated transactors. In terms of the efficient-con-
tracting paradigm, it appears that hypothetical bargains that diverge 
from parties' understandings - whether those understandings are ra-
tional or not - should not be imposed if the parties will respond by 
changing their conduct in costly or undesirable ways. 113 One can ven-
transactors are unlikely to have strong views, either because the relevant considerations for dif-
ferent rules seem in equipoise or simply because they do not really care which rule is adopted as 
long as the rule is clear. Thus, the extent of paternalism, in corporate law for example, may be 
linked to what some commentators have termed the "triviality" of the corresponding legal rules. 
See, e.g., Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 542, 551-61 (1990). 
110. They shift assets to investments opportunities that now appear more valuable to them 
than the corporations with newfangled boards, up to the point where the alternative investment 
opportunities appear to them to yield a return no greater than the (now reduced) values of the 
corporations with newfangled boards. 
111. See Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-
Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus. 469, 504 (1979) (scenario for economic disaster 
following upon mandated composition of boards). 
112. These arrangements may incorporate more or less elaborate contractual attempts to 
simulate the advantages of incorporation through the partnership form. 
113. This may be encompassed within what Clark refers to as "weak" paternalism. See 
Clark, supra note 6, at 1726. It might be helpful to have a distinct label- perhaps "insipid" or 
"wimpy" paternalism - for the form of hypothetical bargain that tries to be rational, but gives 
up to a substantial degree because the decisionmaker recognizes that her efforts to impose a 
rational bargain will be defeated by transactors' various avoidance strategies. 
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ture beyond this rather insipid form of paternalism only when transac-
tions are so poorly informed that they do not even realize what the 
rule is, or where they can take feasible or cost-justified avoidance 
measures, although they know what is at stake and would prefer a 
different rule. 
Generally, only some - perhaps a relatively small number - of 
the affected transactors will bargain around the rule. Here the adjudi-
cator must balance the benefits of mandating the "right" rule for some 
transactors against the costs that this imposes on other transactors 
who bargain around the rule. The degree to which the decisionmaker, 
when constructing the hypothetical bargain departs, from the rules 
that she considers ideal, will depend upon the benefits and costs of 
intervention: the "marginal costs of resistance" to the paternalistic 
intervention, on the one hand, and the "marginal gains from interven-
tion," on the other. For example, when some transactors incur costs 
to evade the rule while others succumb to the rule (to their benefit, in 
the end), the gain by improving the welfare of those who succumb to 
the rule may outweigh the costs incurred by those who bargain around 
the rule. The persons whose mistaken judgment the decisionmaker is 
trying to correct may simply contract out of the protective duties im-
posed by law, or forgo the benefits of the transaction altogether, which 
may be a worse outcome for them.114 The efficient-contracting view of 
hypothetical bargains should not, then, be equated with paternalism; 
only in a narrow range of circumstances will considerations of effi-
ciency justify an attempt to correct for transactors' errors of 
judgment.115 
3. Conclusion 
A transaction-costs method for constructing hypothetical bargains 
distinguishes three types of cases: 
(1) If the adjudicator readily can determine that all transactors 
would bargain to rule X, and would bargain around any other rule Y 
that differed from rule X, then she should adopt rule X 
(2) If transactors will not bargain around whatever rule that the 
adjudicator would adopt, the adjudicator should adopt the rule that 
114. A paternalist should take this last phenomenon into account when setting up her rules. 
115. Note that the objection does not apply to torts among strangers who cannot feasibly 
bargain around the rule. But even much of tort law concerns parties in contractual relationship: 
products liability and professional malpractice offer areas of great current controversy. And even 
for torts among strangers, it is possible that "paternalistic" rules would have counterproductive 
activity level effects, though this possibility goes beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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minimizes ex post costs of opportunistic behavior to transactors taken 
as a group. 
(3) If some transactors will bargain around rule X, and other will 
not, then the relevant total cost of rule X is the costs of bargaining 
around plus the costs of ex post opportunistic behavior under the rule 
for those who stick with it. The adjudicator should aggregate the costs 
for each alternative rule and choose the rule with the lowest total cost. 
III. INTEGRATING THE COMPETING CLAIMS OF ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES 
A. Integration of Interpretive Strategies 
There is considerable diversity among the types of arguments made 
in the course of constructing a legal system for enforcing agreements. 
This diversity is not always troubling, however. For example, the dif-
ferent conceptions that I have described roughly coincide in the basic 
conclusions that they draw as to enforcement of expressly made agree-
ments. For when two rational and well-informed parties make an 
agreement, all three modes of justification argue for enforcement. On 
autonomy grounds, the parties have chosen to be bound. On benefit 
grounds, that the parties have freely chosen could be taken to indicate 
that the proposed exchange is fair. On efficiency grounds, free choice 
ex ante indicates that the exchange will enhance joint welfare. Con-
versely, when parties are mistaken or poorly informed, all three modes 
provide grounds for setting aside the transaction. To protect persons 
from fraud, force, or error enhances autonomy; the mistake vitiates 
the inference that a fair exchange of benefit was contemplated; and, 
correspondingly, if the parties are mistaken, it might enhance joint 
welfare to prevent the transactions from going forward.116 
The three justificatory principles often converge on a standard for 
constructing hypothetical bargains with the goal of minimizing costs 
of transacting. Both the autonomy and the benefit theorist may en-
dorse this standard: both may view the scope of bargains hypotheti-
cally consented to as a question to be resolved by interpretive 
conventions established by the adjudicator, and may conclude that 
these conventions should be established simply to advance the social 
goal of facilitating transactions. 
The three paradigms nonetheless often conflict. Consider, for ex-
116. Again, these principles might point in different directions on subsidiary questions such 
as the scope of excuses or of responsibility for mistaken assumptions. Differences regarding what 
counts as mistake or poor judgment under different normative theories generate different out-
comes. As to the question of what constitutes an exercise of judgment sufficient to bind a party 
to a contract, the principles that we have considered may come to very substantial disagreement. 
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ample, the case in which ninety percent of transaction pairs contem-
plate rule X,· ten percent contemplate rule Y. A theorist who, on 
autonomy and fairness grounds, thought that courts should adopt the 
rule that each pair contemplated would conduct a careful inquiry into 
whether the pair at issue contemplated rule X or rule Y. If this were 
costly or impossible, she might adopt rule X, with the understanding 
that she likely matched the parties' intention. 
In contrast, an efficiency analyst would want to know what the 
costs of adopting each approach would be. Recall the example in 
which it is quite easy for the ninety percent transaction pairs to bar-
gain around the rule and quite difficult for the ten percent transaction 
pairs. On these facts, the efficiency analyst would urge the court to 
adopt rule Y, if it must choose between the two.117 
When the liberal learned of the efficiency theorist's approach, she 
might respond: "Oh, I see . . . I didn't think of that. Well, what I 
should do is define my goal to get maximum possible fit with expecta-
tions at minimum cost. By that standard, I should choose rule Y, be-
cause then everyone will get the rule that they want, at relatively less 
total cost." She would then have to reconsider whether this outcome 
- maximum fit at minimum cost - is a more sensible definition of 
her goals of autonomy than her first definition - maximum case-by-
case fit with expectations when parties do not advert to any prean-
nounced rule. She will face several analytic difficulties, however. She 
will have to decide how much extra fit is worth how much extra cost. 
Further, she at first might be able to explain why those who want rule 
X should bear the transaction costs that result from setting Y as the 
default - why this reduction in costs can count as a good sufficient to 
justify departure from the goal of obtaining fit ex post. She might in-
voke some notion of probabilistic compensation to solve this problem. 
Or she might have a supplemental set of communitarian values that 
would permit her to tax one group to help another group get closer to 
a truly autonomous (self-governing) structure for their relationship. 
Finally, the liberal adjudicator who regularly employs a hypothetical 
bargain construction may have to consult some notion of prospectivity 
or retroactivity that the efficiency analyst, relying on accepted transi-
tions analysis, would feel free to ignore, at least for moderately sophis-
ticated transactors. 118 Perhaps she could announce rule Y for future 
117. The adjudicator would choose one of the two rules for all cases, rather than tailoring the 
rule to the specific transaction, if the costs of a case-by-case inquiry outweighed the benefits (in 
terms of costs saved by a case-by-case inquiry as contrasted to the costs of either rule X or rule 
l'). 
118. Compare, e.g., L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF LAW 6-8 (1968), with Kaplow, Economic 
Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509, 536-50, 576-80 (1986). 
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cases, trying to figure out in the present case what the parties had 
expected, but commit to forgo that inquiry in the future.119 
This problem often arises. In many instances, adjudicators con-
struct background rules that are easy to opt out of, even though many 
will opt out of them, because they wish to make those rules available 
to the few who really require them. Indeed, this is the general struc-
ture of implied legal duties, such as fiduciary duty and the duty of 
good faith. These duties encompass an elaborate set of specific norms 
that have been developed by courts and that apply automatically to 
various relationships - such as the fiduciary duty of the agent to his 
principal, or the good faith duty of a seller of goods to the buyer. But, 
as the example here illustrates, courts should not construct these im-
plied duties simply by asking "what the parties would have agreed to." 
Rather, courts should consider as well the effect of the particular 
method that they adopt on the conduct of other transactors. In partic-
ular, a focus on the actual expectations of particular parties may im-
pose enormous costs on other transactors by forcing them to specify 
terms that they could otherwise leave out, or by imposing on them 
terms that are undesirable for them. 
Through a process by which the abstract norms of the three 
frameworks are appropriately defined, one might laboriously specify 
how courts should resolve these conflicts. In what follows, however, I 
shall propose a framework that indicates the appropriate method of 
interpretation without a complex analysis for each possible transac-
tional setting. The framework categorizes transaction types by social 
facts about the transactors. 
First, the framework describes cases in which a clear choice be-
tween formalist and contextualist strategies is dictated equally by each 
of the three justificatory models. Here there are three types of cases: 
(1) all pairs of transactors would bargain to the same set of contract 
terms; (2) sophisticated transactors have fully "internalized" efficiency 
norms; or (3) transactors follow "localized" conventions or customs to 
which courts should defer. 120 In the next section I consider each of 
these types of cases. 
119. Prima facie, then, conflicts among principles are most likely to arise in instances in 
which different pairs of transactors would bargain to different terms because of differences in 
preferences, knowledge, or bargaining skill. 
120. In particular, some cases arise in which the attempt to implement autonomy or reci-
procity norms via the construction of hypothetical bargains - as conceived by some contract 
lawyers - will be frustrated or "trumped" by contracting around by transactional participants. 
The priority of efficiency considerations follows from the social conditions in which the conflicts 
might arise, rather than from inherent normative features of the justificatory conceptions, ab-
stractly considered. 
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Second, the framework identifies cases in which the choice of inter-
pretive strategy is determined by a conception of "cost" that includes 
some conception of social interest identified in terms of autonomy or 
reciprocity. In my view, it is best to think of this second type of case 
as one in which the different principles serve supplementary justifica-
tory roles. Most often, as I shall explain, considerations of autonomy 
or just distribution might be· useful in supplementing or filling out the 
notion of transaction costs by presenting reasons that certain types of 
costs should be valued in certain ways by adjudicators. These interests 
are simply guidelines to an adjudicator who must either estimate the 
cost of a given rule to some transactor or who must find a formula for 
aggregating costs that the rule imposes on different transactors. 121 
B. Concu"ence of Justificatory Paradigms 
1. Unanimity Among Transactors 
When every pair of transactors would agree to the same term if 
they negotiated it, the three principles generally will call for enforce-
ment of that term. 122 If the adjudicator implies a different term from 
what the transactors would specify, the transactors simply will incur 
the added costs of bargaining around or of adjusting other transac-
tional conduct. For example, if all employers and workers would bar-
gain for at will employment, all three paradigms commend this as the 
appropriate hypothetical bargain term when the employment contract 
is silent on duration of employment and conditions of termination. 
2. Incorporation of Efficient Rules into Socially Embedded 
Understandings 
In many types of transactions, the understandings of the parties in 
fact coincide with those that are or would be prescribed by instrumen-
tal construction of conventions. The meaning attributed to words by 
most transactors and by a legal decisionmaker establishing a set of 
121. Another way to conceive of this relationship is to see the three principles as fitting into 
an overall framework which is broadly consequentialist or pragmatic in focus. This "meta". 
framework sorts out the relative weight to be given to concerns with autonomy, fair distribution, 
and the cost of transacting in different types of situations. While I find this less intuitively ap-
pealing, persons who like to think of "cost" in a restrictive sense will find that various other 
interests must be considered under the rubric of autonomy or fair distribution. I think it is 
clearly preferable to use the broad instrumental formulation in the previous paragraph. 
122. To be sure, courts should not enforce a reconstructed hypothetical bargain if they wish 
to provide an incentive for the parties to specify the terms. As we have seen, principles of con-
tract might commend this approach if, for example, it is more costly for the courts to determine 
what term the parties want than for the parties to specify the term, or if forcing parties to specify 
the term would have a desirable disciplinary effect on their conduct of transactions. Clearly, the 
considerations do not apply where the court at reasonable cost makes the judgment that virtually 
all transactors would bargain to the same term. 
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conventional (code) formulations will often coincide. And transactors 
understand that unspecified or ambiguous terms will be interpreted in 
accordance with instrumental criteria. 
This occurs when three prerequisites are satisfied. First, the trans-
actors advert to legal enforceability of their bargain. Second, transac-
tors follow well-defined and efficient conventions for drafting 
contracts. Third, transactors can inform themselves of the set of back-
ground interpretive conventions.123 
These conditions obtain when sophisticated, well-advised commer-
cial parties (usually, repeat players) contract on the basis of carefully 
drafted contracts. In these cases, the law should choose norms on the 
basis of contracting costs: the countervailing interpretivist claims for 
further contextualization are weak. If interpretive conventions are 
well defined, there is no point in incurring the costs of further contex-
tualization. The adjudicator plausibly confines its attention to the 
plain language of a written document - ignoring other evidence of the 
parties' intent or understandings - on the view that focus on the plain 
language is efficient. The costs of erroneously determining the parties' 
"real" intent would, on this view, be outweighed by the benefits of a 
plain language rule, such as cheaper adjudication and incentives to the 
parties to express themselves clearly.124 
For example, in Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insur-
ance Co., 125 the court had to decide whether the contract unambigu-
ously set the terms of the parties' right to declare default on a loan.126 
123. The transactors can form a reasonably accurate probability estimate of the value of the 
entire contract as a package of contingent outcomes. 
124. To be sure, under some suppositions about ordinary language, it might appear desirable 
to use a code that incorporates many ordinary usages. A rule that always applied ordinary rules 
of meaning might appear easy to comply with, stable (as it would always exactly correspond to 
these ordinary rules), and easy for courts to apply (on the assumption that this information is 
readily available). But no generalization is powerful enough here to confirm a priori the validity 
ofTraynor's formulation of the appropriate interpretive test. The difficulty is that ordinary con· 
versational usage is likely to be much sloppier than what would be desirable for determining legal 
rights and obligations. Note in particular that ordinary language develops to achieve the degree 
of precision required for what is at stake in casual exchanges, which is much less than for many 
formal contracts. Further, ordinary language is less precise to the extent that we interpret, in 
ordinary conversation, statements in light of other contextual cues - eye and body language, 
knowledge of a person's character and linguistic habits, and so on - all of which would have to 
be adduced to the court to make ordinary conversational language fully comprehensible even 
with the degree of precision it obtains in ordinary speech. And, as legal language will evolve in 
the context of related meanings that gradually diverge from ordinary meaning, the choice among 
possible meanings grows larger. The attempt always to approximate ordinary understandings 
then leads to the vices that Kozinski identifies - complex litigation, use of unreliable evidence, 
arbitrary judgment, and consequent transactional uncertainty. 
125. 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988), discussed supra Part I. 
126. In particular, the borrower claimed the right to prepay the loan under a contract term 
setting a prepayment fee "[i]n the event of a prepayment resulting from a default." 847 F.2d at 
566. The lender pointed - quite reasonably, it would seem, though to no avail - to a term that 
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The borrowers were two large law firms; the lender a life insurance 
company. From an efficient-contracting perspective, the document re-
quires no clarification or supplementation by other contextual evi-
dence: the standard "code"127 for commercial arrangements 
determines the relevant meanings. 
The interpretive problem in Trident Center exemplifies the conver-
gence of instrumental and embedded norms: Trident Center is an easy 
case because the plausibly invoked norms of the community coincide 
readily both with those that are most plausibly efficient and with the 
familiar moral and political claims for formalist adjudication.128 In-
deed Judge Kozinski's opinion does not proceed directly to considera-
tions of efficiency. Rather, Judge Kozinski considers the commercial 
context with sufficient depth to conclude that highly formalized norms 
are appropriately applied in this context. The type of transaction and 
the sophistication of the parties, Judge Kozinski emphasizes, lead 
readily to the invocation of formalized norms of interpretation. 
A key empirical indication that transactors have entirely incorpo-
rated within their own understandings the conventional structure of 
interpretation is that, when an interpretation is unclear, they gamble 
on interpretive outcomes in the course of transacting. In Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc. v. Sun Bank, National Association 129 it was un-
clear ex ante what conversion rights would remain to holders of con-
vertible debentures after the dividend was paid. But holders could 
make a large profit by converting before the dividend was paid. None-
theless, two arbitrageurs and a previous bidder for the company 
bought up about a quarter of the outstanding debentures and did not 
convert them. Under the interpretation of the antidilution provision 
for which these purchasers subsequently argued, the provision would 
have entitled them to acquire 42.5 million shares and thereby wrest 
provided that the borrower "shall not have the right to prepay the principal amount hereof in 
whole or in part before January 1996." 847 F.2d at 566. 
127. Aside from establishing a "code" in the sense of a set of applicable rules, the Uniform 
Commercial Code and accompanying background law creates a code in the sense of a set of 
terms and their stipulative definitions. 
128. The extension of this formalist interpretive paradigm to other cases involving rights and 
duties of lenders has been subject to considerable controversy. See infra section 111.B.3. 
129. No. 87-3985 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 25, 1987) available in Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
schedule 13D (filed July 9, 1987). In this case, literal construction of the antidilution provision 
of Harcourt's convertible indentures, as applied following HBJ's recapitalization through a spe-
cial dividend of cash and preferred stock, would have resulted in a negative conversion price - a 
perverse outcome that reflects discrepancies between asset and share values analyzed in Kraak-
man, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of ''Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisi-
tion Move, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988). 
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control of the company from current management. 13° Clearly, the 
purchasers were not acting on the assumption of any generally shared, 
or even subjectively held, standard about how the indenture should be 
interpreted; rather, they were simply betting on the (relatively low) 
probability that the interpretation most profitable to them subse-
quently would be adopted.131 
More difficult cases arise where one party misunderstands the con-
tract because he does not understand the "code" to which it refers. It 
is tempting for courts to protect the ill-informed party. In particular, 
principles of autonomy or fairness might commend such protection. 
The misinformed party might be thought not to have actually con-
sented to the bargain. Or to permit the more sophisticated party to 
derive profit from its sophistication might be thought to victimize the 
misinformed party undeservedly, to confiscate wealth from him in 
contradiction to conceptions of just distribution, or to deprive him of 
needed resources. 
Nonetheless, neither autonomy nor fairness principles can justify 
departures from the code for misinformed parties. Where one party to 
a transaction type is a sophisticated repeat player, attempts to protect 
other values through construction of hypothetical bargains are self-
defeating. The transactors will trump the adjudicator's intervention 
by bargaining around the rule. 
A recurrent example of this sort of intervention is the tendency of 
courts - under the guise of "interpretation," particularly the contra 
proferentem rule of construction132 to try to tilt litigation outcomes 
toward the party whom they perceive to be the adherent to a "contract 
of adhesion."133 The contra proferentem rule is highly wasteful be-
130. The purchasers, supported by the indenture trustee, argued that under New York law 
the conversion price could not drop below the par value of the stock. 
131. The purchasers' probability estimate can be calculated from the amount spent acquiring 
the debentures, their transaction and litigation costs, and, most problematically, the value that 
the purchasers attached to control of the company. From publicly available data, one might 
calculate this probability if one assumes that the value was some specified fraction more than the 
bidder's highest previous bid. 
132. Under the contra proferentem rule, courts resolve contractual gaps and ambiguities 
against the drafter of the contract in situations where the other party has no opportunity to 
negotiate particular terms. Thus, the rule is routinely applied when courts interpret form con-
tracts used and drafted by banks, insurance companies, consumer finance companies, and so 
forth, for use in mass transactions. 
133. A classic discussion is Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629, 638-40 
(1943). The contra proferentem rule has greater bite, the more willing courts are to find ambigui-
ties in contract terms. Modem courts show little restraint in finding ambiguity. In particular, 
courts seem to have discovered that in contracts with multiple provisions it is frequently possible 
to create an ambiguity by taking two clauses - the one designed to modify the other - and 
pretending that in fact the purported modification creates an ambiguity or contradiction. See, 
e.g., Nathaniel Shipping, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 920 F.2d 1256, 1266 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding 
conflict between express warranty clause and limitation on liability for consequential or inciden-
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cause it forces parties constantly to revise terms to override judicial 
rulings that are overly protective of the nonproferring parties. In ad-
dition, the rule makes it harder for parties to adopt innovative con-
tract terms, for an innovative term will leave the parties uncertain 
about what "ambiguities" courts will find to resolve against the 
drafter. 
Nor can the contra proferentem rule redistribute between the prof-
fering and nonproffering parties.134 The proffering party that recog-
nizes that the contra proferentem rule will be applied in various 
contingencies not clearly covered by express contract language135 will 
simply "price" the probability of such contingencies;136 or, the drafter 
will fashion other terms more onerously to compensate for the possible 
loss of advantage under the potentially ambiguous term. 137 
This is not to say that the contra proferentem rule should never be 
applied. The rule should be understood as a particular form of the 
duty to disclose and applied accordingly. The rule requires one party 
to explain to the other what the clause means in circumstances where 
its application is ambiguous. In effect, the drafting party is required to 
explain to the other what the clause means. She should be required to 
do so when it would be substantially cheaper for her to explain the 
ambiguity to the other party than it would be for the other party to 
detect and clarify the ambiguity itself. At best, then, application to all 
form contracts might be justified on the rough generalization that 
drafter is better situated than its transactional partners to appreciate 
the meaning of the term, and to explain to each of them the terms that 
are most likely otherwise to be misunderstood. But the rule should 
ta1 damages); Crescent Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 898 F.2d 581, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(refusing to read paragraph 4's requirement of arbitration in connection with paragraph 6's re-
quirement that arbitration be sought in Cincinnati). Such cases seem particularly anomalous 
because they deal with sophisticated business "repeat players." Increasingly, courts simply ig-
nore the distinction, applying the rule equally to all types of transactors, see, e.g., In re Delta 
Am. Reins. Co., 900 F.2d 890, 892 n.4 (6th Cir.) (noting courts' failure to make distinction}, cert. 
denied sub nom. Wright v. Anon Ins. Co., 111 S. Ct. 233 (1990), a trend clearly incorrect, for 
reasons explained in text. 
134. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 107, at 609 (describing purported redistributive effect of contra 
proferentem rules}. 
135. If the contra proferentem rule is coherently applied, this will be true because the rule is 
designed to select out highly sophisticated contract drafters to bear the risks of mistakes or ambi-
guities in draftsmanship. 
136. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 118 (transactors' anticipatory pricing of prospective changes in 
legal rules). 
137. The rule may have some effect regarding distribution among two classes of nonproffer-
ring parties - those who are and those who are not affected by a contingency as to a contract 
term about which the contra proferentem rule is applied. But it is not clear why one would wish 
to redistribute from those who are not affected by a given contingency to those transactors that 
are (and are willing to litigate the dispute about how the contingency should be treated}. 
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not be applied where no real duty to clarify is contemplated: it is 
pointless to force parties to draft contracts slightly more carefully for 
the benefit of parties who will not read the form in any event. 138 
Courts should invoke the rule, then, only in exceptional cases, where it 
can serve to supplement a strong duty to explain the force of terms. 139 
3. Interpretation Based on Embedded Social Understandings 
A third type of transaction displays these features: transactors 
have a range of preferences and knowledge, and they would bargain to 
a range of terms to which transactors would bargain, depending on 
preferences, knowledge, and bargaining skills. Understandings re-
garding any contingency not written into the formal contract arise lo-
cally as a matter of custom, tradition, received wisdom, widely shared 
but unarticulated assumptions, and so forth. 
The analysis initially requires distinguishing among three roles of 
"custom" in constructing the hypothetical bargain. First, to deter-
mine what transactors intend by using a term, courts may advert to 
how transactors ordinarily use that term. For example, firm commit-
ment underwriters attach, in their ordinary way of speaking and writ-
ing, a particular connotation to the term "adverse market 
conditions";140 film stars and their agents, and book writers and their 
agents, attach precise, albeit very different, meanings to the term 
"edit";141 courts naturally consult the standard usages of persons in 
138. While the slight tilt towards clarity created by the contra proferentem rule might save 
judges' time in sorting out ambiguous provisions, the rule correspondingly foments controversy 
by encouraging transactors to root out contract "ambiguities" that then would be construed 
against the drafter. On balance, then, the rule is as likely to increase the amount of energy that 
judges devote to construing contract provisions. 
139. A few courts have claimed that there is never a duty "to explain to each other the terms 
ofa written contract." See Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841F.2d282, 287 (9th Cir. 
1988) (Kozinski, J.). But see Rakolf, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1173, 1263-84 (1983) (identifying cases that articulate this duty, and arguing for 
its expansion); cf. Shavell, supra note 22, and Bebchuk, supra note 6. Substantial research re· 
mains to be done on these issues. It seems likely that such requirements will often be useful, 
given large discrepancies in access to information about transactional terms and conditions. For 
a preliminary assessment, see Charny, supra note 41, at 444-45. 
Kozinski's approach has virtue of consistency: he has combined his hostility to duties of 
explanation with a narrowing of the contra proferentem rule, accomplished by a resolute refusal 
to find contract ambiguity. His position goes too far, however, in focusing only on the literal 
language of the contract to assess clarity, without regard to the transactor's reasonable assump-
tions about the background or customary term. For example, in Travelers Ins. Corp. v. Budget 
Rent-a-Car Sys., 901 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1990), only the most scrupulous and astute reader of 
form contracts would notice that the clause used by Budget Rent-a-Car, as a grammatical mat· 
ter, changes the meaning of the co=only used insurance clause, which would have included the 
accident in question. 
140. E.g., Walk-In Medical Centers, Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., 818 F.2d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
141. Compare Edison v. Viva Intl., Ltd., 70 A.D.2d 379, 382 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (1979) (con· 
struing publisher's "right to edit ..• the Work") with Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 
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the trade to find out what they would have meant by employing a 
particular term. 
Second, courts consult trade custom to infer meaning from how 
parties conduct themselves. In these cases, the relevant interpretive da-
tum is not how transactors in the trade ordinarily use a word, but how 
they act. For example, to determine whether the words "distributor-
ship" or "best efforts" imply that the distributor will deal exclusively 
with a particular source of supply, courts often take as decisive the 
general business arrangement in the trade, without considering 
whether that arrangement arises from the use of any particular con-
tractual language.142 
Third, courts may infer meaning from parties' conduct in reference 
to particular language. To extend the example in the previous 
paragraphs, a court might note that, when transactors used a "best 
efforts" clause, the distributor always represented one manufacturer 
exclusively; when transactors omitted a "best efforts" clause, the dis-
tributor represented many manufacturers. The case differs from the 
previous inference, for here the court finds a link between particular 
contract language and particular conduct, not just between a particular 
transaction (such as the manufacturer-dealer relationship) and particu-
lar conduct. This third type of inference is surprisingly uncommon in 
the case law. Most frequently, courts draw such an inference from 
conduct of the particular transactors at issue: that is, an inference 
from course of dealing.143 For example, the parties' acceptance of a 
letter of credit for "dry coking coal" - under a contract for "coal" -
may indicate that they understood the contract term "coal" to mean 
"dry coking coal."144 
Misc. 2d 363, 367, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594, 599, ajfd., 25 A.D.2d 830, 269 N.Y.S.2d 913, affd., 18 
N.Y.2d 659, 273 N.Y.S.2d 80, 219 N.E.2d 431) (1966) (construing movie producer's "right to 
'finally' cut and edit ... the original production of [a] motion picture") and Stevens v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 270 Cal. App. 2d 886, 891-93, 76 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (1969) (considering 
whether insertion of television commercials in television exhibition of movie constitutes "cutting 
and editing"). Law review editors, in tum, apparently attach still a third, and some might say 
deeply idiosyncratic meaning, to "edit." 
142. See, e.g., Steven Star Shoe Co. v. Strictly Goodies, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 917, 921 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (contract term "representative" connotes to represent exclusively); Joyce Bever-
ages ofN.Y., Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271, 275-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (constru-
ing "best efforts" clause to require exclusivity); cf. Polyglycoat Corp. v. C.P.C. Distribs., Inc., 
534 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding on basis of industry practice that "best efforts" clause 
not breached by taking on a competitive product line). 
143. This is no doubt the most common because it is difficult for litigants and courts to get 
information both about the preponderant practice in an industry and to link the practice to 
specific contract language; courts do not insist on the latter link, but are satisfied by evidence of 
standard practice industry - the inference described in the preceding paragraph. As I shall 
explain below, judges are incorrect to draw this inference as readily as they apparently do. 
144. East Europe Domestic Intl. Sales Corp. v. Island Creek Coal Sales Co., 572 F. Supp. 
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In these cases, each of the justificatory paradigms commends 
construction of the hypothetical bargain by a fairly strenuous inquiry 
into the assumptions of particular transactors: it is efficient - as well 
as "right" or "fair" from the perspective of theories of autonomy or 
benefit - to interpret by reconstructing the parties' actual 
understandings. 
The fairness of the inquiry follows readily from basic considera-
tions of autonomy and benefit. These conceptions favor attempting to 
achieve maximum fit with individual transactor's reasonable 
expectations. 
The claim for the efficiency of reconstructing understandings is 
more complex and depends on two empirical generalizations. First, 
any single highly general norm diverges from many parties' under-
standings because understandings vary with trade contexts.145 If indi-
vidual transactors become aware of this divergence, the divergence 
raises transaction costs: individuals will decline to transact, or draft 
more elaborate contracts, to prevent adjudicators from later reaching 
decisions that depart from the treatment of contingencies that they 
would contemplate.146 
Second, the more likely the custom itself is efficient, the more 
likely it will be efficient to reconstruct embedded understandings in 
adjudication.147 For several reasons, such understandings are likely to 
be efficient. The understandings have been tested over time, and likely 
would have changed if they did not work well. 148 Self-interested trans-
actors have a clear incentive to change (by negotiating around or by 
adopting new practices) customs that are dysfunctional for them, or 
customs that, because they are dysfunctional for other transactors, 
raise the cost to them of transacting. Further, repeat transactors will 
have substantial experience with the trade custom, so they will be rela-
702, 708-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Such use of past conduct is quite common in the reported cases, 
and presumably even more so when transactors informally resolve disagreements. 
145. For example, it would be absurd to attempt to define a single meaning of the term "edit" 
in contracts throughout the communications industry. 
146. John Langbein's comparison of American and European drafting practices provides in-
teresting comparative evidence for such defensive contracting. Langbein, supra note 24. 
147. A linguistic usage is efficient if it minimizes drafting and error costs. For example, it 
would be very inefficient for American transactors to draft contracts in Latin, because most 
transactors do not know Latin and so would have to bear the cost of hiring a translator in order 
to interpret the contract. Further, those who think they know some Latin, and so forgo a trans-
lator, may often make mistakes because of their imperfect knowledge. 
148. This analysis of the efficiency of transactional customs draws on more general work on 
efficiency of customary formulations in Clark, supra note 6, at 1730-37; Ellickson, Of Coase and 
Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. RE.v. 623, 657-85 
(1986); cf. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 67, 93-98 (1987) (reviewing theories about origins of social norms). 
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tively well informed about how the custom works out in practice. Re-
latedly, trade customs are likely efficient because they represent the 
consensus judgment of numerous transactors, thus smoothing out er-
rors that individual transactors might make.149 For these reasons, the 
court should take the trouble to determine the local trade practice, 
rather than simply construct a general rule. 
This analysis supports four propositions about the adjudicators' 
use of customary formulations in constructing hypothetical 
contracts: 150 
(a) When a contract is silent on a contingency, courts should gener-
ally incorporate trade custom as a source of obligation. When a con-
tract explicitly addresses an issue, courts should interpret or modify 
the contract term by reference to trade custom when the contract term 
itself is facially ambiguous. m Trade custom may provide rational or 
efficient gap-fillers for defining specific terms - the first and third uses 
of custom noted above. But transactors may not wish to attach legal 
sanctions to customary norms. In particular, it may be desirable to 
leave enforcement of custom to nonlegal sanctions, such as informal 
complaint, loss of future business, and the like. Before employing the 
second use of custom - the inference that custom provides a legally 
enforceable contract term - courts should carefully consider whether 
the term is one that parties would rationally leave to nonlegal 
sanctions.152 
(b) Courts should take a skeptical view of the wisdom of transactors' 
express decisions to override custom. Courts that have analyzed the 
149. Finally, trade customs, unlike other types of customary rules, will generally be hard to 
fabricate; evidence of the custom will be reliable. Cf. J. HERRIN, THE FORMATION OF CHRIS-
TENDOM (1987) (fabricated traditions in the canon law); E. HOBSBAWM & T. RANGER, THE 
INVENTION OF TRADmoN (1983) (discussing fabrication of custom). 
To be sure, there is a flipside to the considerations discussed in text. Once a custom is estab-
lished, it may be hard for any individual transactor to change it, even if changing it is a good 
idea. And the consensus judgment of numerous transactors is of warrant to the value of the 
custom only if the transactors are making an independent judgment rather than simply "follow-
ing the crowd"; in fact, there are strong pressures to imitate, and much evidence shows that 
transactors in these circumstances simply will unquestioningly follow the established rule, 
whatever it is. Most problematically, the adjudicator must try to distinguish between customs 
that are efficient to use as nonlegal customs, i.e., standard social practices. as contrasted to cus-
toms that should be enforced as well as a legal or contractual matter. I build these caveats into 
the proposed rules for interpretation of customary formulations that follows. 
150. The most complete analysis of the role of custom in contract interpretation is to be 
found in Goetz & Scott, supra note 61, at 305-20. The propositions for which I argue here, 
however, substantially expand the role of custom beyond that acknowledged by Goetz and Scott. 
151. See. e.g., U.C.C. § 1-205 (1986). Aficionados of contract doctrine may think ofthese-
as Goetz and Scott propose - as formulations of the plain meaning and the parol evidence rules, 
respectively. I am not confident, however, that Goetz and Scott's normative principles fit com-
pletely into these doctrinal pigeonholes. 
152. For guidelines regarding this assessment, see Charny, supra note 41, at 456-63. 
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trumping of customary formulation have done precisely that. For ex-
ample, in Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust v. Pemberton, 153 the 
contract between the bank and an automobile dealer provided for a 
waiver of notice of insurance cancellation on vehicles that the dealer 
had leased or had sold on credit. But trade custom and course of deal-
ing had been to give such notices. The court held that trade custom 
and course of dealing overrode the express provision because the pro-
vision had not been "conspicuous."154 Apparently, parties may con-
tract to overrule custom only if they have deliberated carefully about 
the matter. 
Provident Tradesmen's Bank ignores the UCC's mandate that ex-
press contract terms override implications from custom and usage. 
Nonetheless, the decision makes sense from an efficient-contracting 
perspective if transactors' customary practices are generally efficient 
and if the term is one for which legal sanction is appropriate. If so, 
then adjudicators, in reconstructing the bargain as a matter of inter-
pretation, should place extra constraints on the ability of the parties to 
modify customary terms.155 
(c) Adjudicators should consider the likely efficiency of customary 
formulations when resolving the crucial question of the interpretive stan-
dard by which one determines whether the contract is ''silent" or 
"facially ambiguous" as to the issue that might be resolved by cus-
tom. 156 How ready the legal decisionmaker is to conclude that a pro-
vision is silent depends on how convinced the legal decisionmaker is 
that custom, or other forms of embedded interpretation that appeal to 
community norms, are more likely to be efficient than the explicit 
clauses of a particular document. 
To resolve these issues within the efficient-contracting perspective, 
one must specify the institutional costs of inquiry in custom and bal-
ance those costs against the efficiency gains from incorporation of the 
customary rule into the court's interpretation. The institutional costs 
for inquiry into custom include, for example, the costs to the legal 
decisionmaker of discerning that the custom is extant and that it is 
efficient, and the importance of fixed interpretive code for parties' 
planning (degree of risk aversion about possible variations in judicial 
interpretations). The benefits from incorporation of custom will in-
153. 196 Pa. Super. 180, 173 A.2d 780 (1961). 
154. See also, e.g., Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(custom trumps FAS term). 
155. Cf. Clark, supra note 6, at 1744 (calling for deference to "traditional rules" in the con· 
text of corporate law). 
156. Goetz and Scott seem to beg this question in distinguishing between the role of custom 
in interpreting "clear" and "ambiguous" agreements. 
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crease with several factors, including, most importantly, the likelihood 
that there will evolve a custom that is efficient, but deviant from the 
perspective of a simplified interpretive code; and the cost to the parties 
of formalizing customs in express contract provisions (rather than re-
lying on customs not so formalized).151 
Contrast, in this respect, interpretive approaches under articles 2, 
5, and 9 of the UCC.158 In ordinary contracts for purchase and sale of 
goods (at least for small businesspersons dealing with moderately idio-
syncratic transactions), transactors likely will have developed customs 
that deviate from the formalized interpretive code and that would be 
costly to articulate in express contractual language.159 And it is likely 
157. This last criterion has been developed, first by some legal realists and then by the empir-
ical work of the law and society movement, into a general critique of formalist norms of contract 
interpretation. The argument is that legal norms that diverge from what transactors actually do 
simply will not matter very much; all that the law can do is mirror what transactors do in fact. 
The conception seems to be that, when legal norms diverge from actual practice, parties simply 
do not bother to incur the costs of drafting contracts that comply with interpretive norms stipu-
lated by law. Thus, transactors frequently entered into, and purportedly conceived as binding, 
agreements that did not satisfy the requirements of commercial law or that were interpreted in 
commercial law very differently from ordinary business understandings: divergences between 
legal and business norms were observed for matters such as claims settlements, renegotiations of 
loans between creditors and debtors, output and requirements contracts, the perfect tender rule, 
formalization under the parol evidence rule, and so forth. See generally Gordon, Macaulay, 
MacNei/, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 
571-79 (sympathetic account of Law-and-Society view of the "marginality" of contract law); 
Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 465; MacNeil, supra note 39. 
To be sure, a large body of evidence indicates that transactors' conduct - both in forming 
contracts and in postformation conduct - deviates from what would be required as a matter of 
contract law. Classic works include Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration 
by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957), and Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM Soc. REv. 55 (1963). More recent studies have confirmed, in particu-
lar, that businesses often depart from the norms stipulated in the express contract: they tolerate 
other parties' breaches or perform when the contract entitles them to renege. See, e.g., Palay, 
Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 265 (1984); Ross & Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem-Solving Mechanism, 12 LAW & 
SocY. REv. 199 (1978); White, Contract Law in Modem Commercial Transactions, An Artifact of 
Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1982) (chemical companies' supply 
allocations during shortages). 
Nonetheless, this evidence does not imply that law is irrelevant or should serve merely to 
reflect extant social norms. Transactors' dependence upon express contract will depend on draft-
ing and enforcement costs and on the availability of nonlegal sanctions; the parties' decision to 
embody imperfectly the governing norms in an express contract does not indicate that they do 
not advert to these norms or to the background suppletive contract terms that would govern 
them. To the contrary, parties are likely to make decisions about what commitments to make 
legally enforceable, and about when to enforce them, by consulting and comparing the various 
relevant legal and nonlegal sanctions. For a fuller demonstration, see Charny, supra note 41, at 
391-425. 
158. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 621 (1975), and Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant 
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1987), describe article 2's strong deference to commercial cus-
tom. Attributing this deference to the distinctive (and in some regards idiosyncratic) features of 
Llewellyn's jurisprudence, however, these articles fail to consider the instrumental basis for the 
various attitudes towards custom in the different branches of commercial law. 
159. The circumstances under which efficient customs will evolve are complex, and a full 
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that the custom would be enforced as a legal matter, rather than left to 
nonlegal sanctions, because the transactor is likely to have an unduly 
optimistic view of the probability that his partner will comply with the 
custom. Conversely, the importance of a clear, highly predictable set 
of encoded formulations arguably is low, because parties do not often 
advert ex ante to the probabilities oflegal outcomes for particular con-
tingencies. Letters of credit and secured loans appear very different by 
these criteria. Here formality is important; drafters are sophisticated 
parties who can incorporate customary practices; and nonlegal incen-
tives may work well. 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that lender liability cases 
have provided a context where there is substantial disagreement about 
how willing courts should be to modify the meaning of express UCC 
formulations by reference to custom or course of dealing. The trouble-
some feature of these cases is the apparent difficulty that some borrow-
ers have had in appreciating the divergence between fixed contract 
formulations and their own understanding of commercial custom.160 
( d) The law should hold all transactors to established customs, even 
when some transactors' understandings differ from those customs. Most 
prominently, the question arises when the courts apply the "neophyte 
rule." Under that rule, only a transactor experienced in the trade has 
a duty to know trade practice. The transactor new to the trade - the 
"neophyte" - is not legally bound to trade customs that the contract 
does not spell out. 
Courts are sharply split on the appropriate scope of the rule. 
Clearly, two complementary issues are key to analysis: (a) the new-
comer's duty to learn the customs and usages of the trade; and (b) the 
experienced transactor's duty to ascertain that it is dealing with a new-
consideration is beyond the scope of this Article. For example, it appears that efficient commer-
cial customs are most likely to evolve among a group of traders who are roughly homogeneous in 
variables such as the number of transactions each engages in and the large number of other 
traders with whom each interacts. See supra note 48. This fits one paradigmatic market type for 
sales of goods. Note that the criteria would not be satisfied by consumers markets or in long 
term "lock-in" contracts between a buyer and seller. For these contracts, different rules should 
apply, as the UCC suggests. 
160. For examples of the divergence of interpretive approaches applied to letters of credit 
from those applied to sales contracts, see Exxon Co. U.S.A. v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 
828 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated, 488 U.S. 920 (1988); Amoco Oil Co. v. First Bank & 
Trust Co., 759 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. App. 1988). Similar principles apply to interpretation of trust 
indentures. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983). For these instruments, the ease ofincorporating diver-
gent custom and the importance of clarity would seem to be decisive factors. (Judge Winter's 
opinion in Sharon Steel emphasizes the latter). 
For controversy under article 9, compare, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 
(6th Cir. 1985) (limiting discretion to demand payment on note payable on demand), with Flag-
ship Natl. Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1340-41 (Fla. App. 1986) (declining to 
follow K.M.C.). 
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comer and to inform him of relevant customs.161 
Principles of autonomy and reciprocity clearly accommodate a 
wide range of approaches to these issues. Whether the neophyte rule 
is efficient depends upon whether it is cheaper for sophisticated trans-
actors to adapt their conduct to the occasional neophyte than for the 
neophyte to learn all of the rules of the trade before entering it or to 
bear the risk of his mistakes.162 In this regard, the common run of 
cases applying the "neophyte" rule goes too far, for it seems quite un-
likely that the uniform duty of disclosure - in effect, a duty to inquire 
into the background and skills of one's transacting partner - would 
be cheaper than holding the neophyte to at least a minimal standard of 
care. 
C. Assessing Costs by Reference to Principles of Autonomy 
and Reciprocity 
The analysis of the previous section applies to transactions charac-
terized by one of three features: (1) all transactors would bargain to 
the same rule; (2) transactors rationally advert to the probabilities that 
rules will be adopted; (3) transactors have divergent understandings, 
but these understandings are determined by efficient customary 
understandings. 
The analysis leaves unresolved cases with two characteristics. 
First, transactors are not fully rational or do not advert to legal en-
forceability of their statements in deciding what to say. Second, there 
is (or at least there likely will be) a set of interpretive and contracting 
conventions that diverge from ordinary usages of the group of transac-
tors whose transactions are at issue. Under these conditions, one can-
not without further analysis apply the conclusion of the previous 
section that efficiency and other norms commend the same principles 
for constructing hypothetical bargains. The key feature of these cases 
is that, depending on what rule one adopts, one will have different 
161. Courts and legislatures are sharply split on both issues. See, e.g., Flower City Painting 
Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 1979) (neophyte not held to 
trade meaning of term "units" because not aware of the meaning and had no duty to know the 
meaning); Marion Coal Co. v. Marc Rich & Co. Intl., Ltd., 539 F. Supp. 903, 905-06 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (distinguishing Flower City; under U.C.C. § 1-205(3) persons bound by "'any usage of 
trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged' " even if they are new to the trade 
(quoting U.C.C. § 1-205(3)); Doyle Dane Bernbach v. Avis, 526 F. Supp. 117, 119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (business florist not bound to know customs of advertising industry, having had no regular 
dealings with advertisers); Shubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 1081, 399 N.E.2d 1154, 
424 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1979) (usage binding); Shaw v. Dreyfus & Co., 64 Misc. 2d 122, 314 N.Y.S.2d 
372 (1969) (usage binding only if "universal" so that "everyone" would know custom). 
162. In some instances, the rule has an effect on the distribution of transaction costs among 
neophytes and more sophisticated transactors. The next section takes up the analysis of such 
effects. 
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effects on different transactors, or generate different types of costs. 
Principles of free choice or fair sharing of benefits may help supple-
ment efficiency analysis when the adjudicator must decide what alloca-
tion of costs is preferable in order to determine what legal rule to 
adopt, or what type of cost should be incurred. 
In particular, three features of these cases call for further analysis. 
First, the adjudicator's choice about how to construct the hypothetical 
bargain may affect the distribution of wealth among transactors. Sec-
ond, the adjudicator's choice may affect other social values, particu-
larly whether there is a good "fit" between the expectations of 
transactors and the outcomes of adjudicated cases.163 Third, the adju-
dicator's choice may influence transactors' assessment of their own 
preferences. 
1. Aggregation of Gains and Losses 
In these cases, the question is distributional. The adjudicator must 
decide who should bear transactions costs. Consider a simple example 
where some workers would bargain for good faith protection in an at 
will regime; others would bargain for at will in a good faith regime. 
The background rule one adopts determines which group of workers 
bears these bargaining costs. 
What considerations would lead an adjudicator to favor one distri-
butional impact over another? One possibility is differences in wealth: 
if workers who would bargain for good faith protections are relatively 
wealthy, that might support adoption of an at will regime. 164 Another 
reason is that the adjudicator might consider, on autonomy or benefit 
grounds, that the transactor should have an entitlement to a "good": 
for example, rules about unions may impose costs on workers who 
disprefer unions, but that may be consistent with social judgment 
about importance of worker self-determination. 
This analysis readily extends to distribution of ex post costs. Con-
sider, for example, this situation: if adjudicators imply a good faith 
163. One could consider the questions here as different aspects of the (here informally 
treated) problem of constructing the social welfare function that aggregates the various costs and 
benefits of various hypothetical bargains. The first section deals with how the costs are weighted 
depending on who bears them; the second section deals with the problems of estimating how 
much the costs are. 
164. This may be the case for several characteristic reasons. Wealthier workers may win 
larger recoveries in suits for unjust dismissal; they may be more likely to hold jobs where such 
dismissals are a problem (because the firm can profit more by opportunistic behavior vis-a-vis 
highly paid workers); legal protections may be luxury goods that wealthy individuals are more 
willing to purchase (by forgoing additional wages) than poorer workers; and wealthier workers 
may be more sophisticated bargainers. The first three factors suggest that, even if bargaining 
costs were zero, wealthy workers would be more likely than poorer workers to prefer good faith 
protections. 
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term, most workers would bargain around it; only a few would not. If 
adjudicators imply an at-will term, a few workers who want it won't 
bargain for it, but most are spared the costs of bargaining. The costs 
of bargaining around are high. Workers who do not bargain for the 
term bear high costs from unjust terminations. 
If poor workers bear costs of firing, this argues for adopting the 
rule that protects them, placing bargaining costs on wealthier workers. 
Thus, distributive effects are relevant both to distribution of ex ante 
costs and to distribution of ex post losses. 
2. Estimating the Magnitude of Transactions Costs 
The adjudicator who constructs the hypothetical bargain on effi-
ciency terms must first determine the ex ante and ex post costs gener-
ated by the various alternative rules. A natural approach would be to 
assign the costs that the parties themselves would assign. But such 
shadow pricing is notoriously difficult, and adjudicators may lack the 
relevant data. Moreover, when transactors have limited information 
or are irrational, they may assign incorrect values. Instead, the adju-
dicator may have to consider autonomy or benefit values in determin-
ing the magnitude of the relevant costs. 
Consider the values that she might consider in the previous exam-
ple. The court deciding whether to imply a good faith or nongood 
faith term would have to compare the bargaining costs under the good 
faith rule to the ex post losses under the at will rule. Bargaining costs 
are straightforward, although one might want to include indirect costs 
such as the effects of such bargaining on employee relations and so 
forth. But the costs from unfair job terminations might include not 
only direct losses - search costs of new job, unemployment costs, 
costs of moving - but a large component of "psychic loss" such as 
loss of self-esteem or a feeling of being wronged by social arrange-
ments that courts would have trouble attaching value to.165 
In theory, the adjudicator might evaluate these losses by construct-
ing a shadow price: figuring out the compensating wage differential 
that can be accounted for by the greater risk of opportunistic dis-
charge. Such a calculation would be extremely difficult, however, be-
cause it would require the calculator to discern the rate of 
opportunistic discharge in various industries. Further, the wage ad-
justment is a poor index of the workers' actual valuation of job secur-
ity when workers are poorly informed or overly optimistic about their 
165. See, e.g., B. BLUESfONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 
61-66 (1982) (psychic and social losses from unemployment); P. WEILER, GOVERNING THE 
WORKPLACE 70 (1990). 
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job prospects, arguably a common occurrence.166 Finally, the adjudi-
cator might believe that the valuation attached to job security by 
workers, as reflected by wage adjustments, is an inadequate measure of 
the value of job security because it reflects individual valuations, rather 
than the collective benefits of a workplace where the worker-firm rela-
tionship is more scrupulously protected, and because it is limited by 
workers' current income and opportunity set. 
These objections to shadow-pricing - in effect, objections to the 
definition of cost that method implies - point to the types of consider-
ations to which a liberal or communitarian adjudicator might refer in 
valuing the ex post losses that result from alternative contract terms. 
Theories of moral personality attach particular substantive importance 
to some fundamental interests and to the opportunity to give a "lucid" 
or "true" account of these, which workers individually contracting 
may not be able to do ex ante.161 
Further, the adjudicator should consider an inherent value to fit of 
social expectations and legally enforced norms. Suppose, for example, 
that workers and employers mistakenly think that no good faith term 
is the rule. They find out ex post that they are subject to the term. 
Autonomy might also focus on desirability of comporting obligation to 
intention, as well as to the direct ex post costs of these losses. Note 
that those who can bargain for an applicable norm will know what it 
is, so fit suggests imposing costs on them in order to make sure that 
those not informed also enjoy fit ex post if they find out only then what 
the rule is.168 
In appealing to these values, the adjudicator effectively can consult 
norms purportedly independent of transactors' actual preferences and 
166. See Chamy, supra note 41, at 417-18. 
167. See, e.g., Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 786-97 
(1983). 
168. If she focused solely on the impact of the rules on the cost of transacting, the adjudica-
tor would determine the appropriate degree of generality by two inquiries: (1) if transactors will 
bargain around, what is the costs incurred in doing so? (2) If transactors will not bargain 
around, what are the ex post (conduct and enforcement) costs of the different rules? In contrast, 
an adjudicator influenced by conceptions of autonomy could conclude that there is an inherent 
good to individualizing outcomes with prior assumptions, other things being equal. If transac-
tors bargain around, one obtains fit either way, and so the conflict disappears; the only issue is 
whether it is cheaper to get at the parties' preferences for a term by forcing them to write it down 
or by reconstructing it ex post. If there is no bargaining around, however, fit might lead to the 
choice of a rule without adverting to, or considering decisive, the ex post costs incurred. This 
type of conflict may occur frequently. Imaginative reconstruction may mean greater level of 
specificity than instrumental calculation if one concludes that analysis should be conducted at a 
fairly high level of generality (rules with broad scope of application). An instrumentally defined 
convention may accomplish cheaper adjudication because it avoids the need for lots of the spe-
cific proof one needs for more contextualized demonstrations of intent or practice. And the 
instrumentally defined convention may be more predictable as formalized rules of interpretation 
develop and as values of formality are generally inculcated as a social matter. 
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valuations because, by hypothesis, transactors will not trump the adju-
dicator's construction of the (now idealized) hypothetical bargain by 
bargaining around. In other words, the analysis here only applies 
where there are at least some cases where the adjudicator's choice of 
the rule determines what the rule turns out to be for the transactors. 
3. Preferences Influenced by the Default Rules 
A final case where direct evaluation of costs is difficult is the case 
where transactors' preferences - their evaluation of costs and benefits 
- are influenced by the rule that the court adopts. Consider, again, 
the example of employment at will: If adjudicators adopt an at will 
rule, workers and employers will not bargain around it. If adjudica-
tors adopt a good faith rule, workers and employers will not bargain 
around that rule, and experience with the rule will change perceptions 
of appropriate workplace relationships (resolve differences rather than 
firing, loyalty to the firm and so forth). 
There is suggestive evidence for such effects. For example, empiri-
cal laboratory studies of bargaining behavior indicate that persons will 
demand a larger payment to give up a good than they would make to 
obtain that good.169 This suggests that where the background (default) 
rule places an entitlement may, correspondingly, affect how much 
transactors would have to pay to change the background rule:170 em-
169. Harless, More Laboratory Evidence on the Disparity Between Willingness to Pay and 
Compensation Demanded, 11 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 359 (1989) (measuring "endowment ef-
fect"); Knetsch & Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evi-
dence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 507 (1984) (same). The 
celebrated work of Kahneman and Tversky documents the closely related phenomenon of "loss 
aversion": persons see a loss from the status quo as more harmful than a corresponding gain is 
seen as beneficial. See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 EcoNOMETRICA 263, 286 (1979). Finally, the phenomenon posited in text may be cre-
ated by the familiar phenomenon of "sour grapes" or "adaptive preferences" reasoning: persons 
convince themselves that whatever they have is best for them. See J. ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: 
STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109-40 (1983). 
170. Analysts dispute the extent to which such cognitive distortion impairs transactional 
outcomes in markets. See, e.g., Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An 
Essay in the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 329 (1986); Schwartz, supra note 6. There are at least three problems with drawing 
direct inferences about transactors' conduct from experimental studies of cognitive processes. 
First, it may be that transactors understand that such distortions affect their judgment and so 
deliberately attempt to correct for them in deliberating about what contracts to enter into. Sec-
ond, countervailing distortions often make it difficult to extrapolate from laboratory data to real 
world conduct. For example, there is evidence that persons both overestimate and underestimate 
the probabilities of low probability events. (Similarly, if more colloquially: while the fox may 
think that the grapes she cannot reach are always sour, the cow may conclude that the grass is 
always greener on the other side of the fence.) Third, "shopping" by a subgroup of rational 
transactors may suffice to generate efficient results in the market as a whole. See Schwartz & 
Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal Economic Analysis, 
127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 650 (1979); cf. Charny, supra note 41, at 437 n.190 (limitations to this 
mechanism for correcting informational distortions). Nonetheless, there is at least suggestive 
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ployees may not be willing to pay employers enough to obtain good 
will protections; but, once given, employers may not be able to pay 
employees enough to induce them to give up these protections.171 
For the adjudicator, the difficulty is that each rule, once adopted, 
would seem to be efficient. Each rule incurs the same bargaining costs, 
at least to the extent that transactors accept the rule rather than bar-
gaining to change it. Further, each rule corresponds ex post to the 
preferences of the parties.172 Thus, there is no direct efficiency ground 
for choosing one rule over the other. A decisionmaker might be per-
plexed by the circularity of the choices presented. 
Instead, the adjudicator must make a judgment based on some 
other set of values about social relationships. If there is some substan-
tive reason to prefer one's projected (and different) values, then that 
reason, duly acknowledged, simply becomes part of the set of the deci-
sionmakers' considerations. One thus would reach a judgment ex ante 
about the preferability of the various outcomes, lucidly considering the 
desirability of each state of affairs from the point of view of one's cur-
rent values. 173 
D. Critiques of Instrumental Analysis 
As I indicated at the beginning of the article, there is a standard set 
of criticisms of the use of efficiency as a normative conception in con-
tract adjudication, and similarly, within contract theory, a standard, if 
not always carefully formulated, set of nonefficiency justifications for 
enforcement of contracts. I have argued, notwithstanding these other 
approaches, that a transaction costs framework provides a fair basis 
evidence of the effects of entitlements and accompanying cognitive distortions on workers' deci-
sionmaking, see Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFP. 54, 58-62 
(1988) (surveying research in the field). 
171. The legal rule also may affect the outcomes of bargains by creating a background refer-
ence point against which workers test the fairness of contracts that are offered to them. Cf. 
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285, 
8287-88 (1986). The perception that the contract is fair is an important determinant in bargain-
ing outcomes; often workers appear to prefer a fair arrangement over a more lucrative arrange-
ment that appears to be unfair, because, for example, it benefits other workers more than them on 
arbitrary grounds. See. e.g., J. DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTION JUSTICE 133-95 (1985) (empirical stud-
ies in laboratory conditions); P. WEILER, supra note 165; Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift 
Exchange. 91 QJ. EcoN. 543, 549-57 (1982) (economic analysis). 
172. That is, whatever costs are incurred by the rule - such as the litigation costs incurred 
ex post to enforce a good faith rule - are perceived by the parties to be worth the cost. 
173. If one can arrive at no ex ante preference and each outcome is ex post preferred to the 
other, then the preference criterion is indeterminate. This is not a conceptual problem, however, 
but simply reflects the psychological fact that the decisionmaker is genuinely indifferent between 
the two outcomes, a situation unlikely to exist. Similarly, if one can arrive at no ex ante prefer-
ence and each outcome is ex post dispreferred to the other, one faces the prospect of inevitable 
dissatisfaction; again, this identifies a fact about the decisionmaker's psychology, or perhaps, 
psychopathology. 
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for constructing a set of guidelines for enforcing hypothetical bargains. 
Before turning to specific examples of the analysis, it might be useful 
to summarize the ways in which the framework incorporates the con-
cerns expressed by these alternative approaches. The principles of au-
tonomy and fairness, as we have seen, provide a framework for 
understanding how these concerns bear on contract adjudication. 
The critiques of efficiency analysis in contract law focus on three 
aspects. (1) Economic analysis, by emphasizing welfare maximization 
based on the sum of individuals' current preferences, takes an overly 
simple view of human motivations and decisionmaking capabilities 
and thereby neglects other social values that should be served by adju-
dication.174 (2) Economic analysis takes preferences as fixed, as ra-
tional, or as uninfluenced by legal rules, and ignores the effect that 
allocation of goods by market transactions and adjudication that en-
forces rights based on those transactions have on preferences and so-
cial relationships.175 (3) Economic analysis is blind to or biased in 
analyzing distributional consequences of legal rules.176 For critics, 
these features of economic analysis point to the need for another justif-
icatory paradigm for judicial decisionmaking. These critiques are un-
doubtedly serious concerns for some domains of legal rules. 177 
The unified framework presented here appropriately accommo-
dates these concerns. First, regarding other "social values," autonomy 
and fairness theorists may claim that hypothetical contract adjudica-
tion should recognize an independent value to obtaining a close fit be-
tween adjudicated outcomes and socially embedded expectations; 
moreover, that hypothetical contract adjudication should correct for 
false or mistaken preferences held by individual transactors. In appro-
priate cases, efficiency analysis accommodates and, indeed, may en-
dorse these values. In cases where transactors will defer to the 
hypothetical bargain formulated by an adjudicator, the adjudicator 
should construct the bargain to minimize ex post contract losses, and, 
174. E.g., M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmcAL LEGAL STUDIES 126-41 (1987); A. SEN, ON 
ETHICS AND EcONOMICS (1987); Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and Market Illusions: The Limits 
of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309, 1332-34 (1986); Radin, Market-Inalienability, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1866-71 (1987). 
175. J. EI.STER, supra note 169; A. SEN, supra note 174; Radin, supra note 174, at 1871-87, 
1909-14. 
176. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 107; Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation 
of Economic Analysis, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73, 102-03 (reviewing literature). 
177. For example, legal rules regarding taxation undoubtedly influence the distribution of 
wealth. More recently, it has been argued that some rules of corporate law - for example, those 
fostering takeovers or tolerating insider trading - may have had a similar effect over the past 
decade. Another example is the law of racial discrimination, which takes as one of its primary 
goals the changing of preferences with regard to racial contacts in society. 
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in doing so, may consider costs caused by deviation from extant expec-
tations or mistaken judgments by individuals.11s 
The second and third criticisms of efficiency analysis - the need to 
consider effects of adjudication on transactors' preferences and on dis-
tribution of wealth among transactors - also are readily reflected in 
the construction of hypothetical bargains by transaction costs criteria. 
Indeed, the efficiency analyst would have to consider effects on prefer-
ences and distribution when they occur, for these effects alter the as-
sessment of alternative contract terms on efficiency grounds. When 
the choice of contract term by the adjudicator influences preferences 
or distributions, efficiency analysis is indeterminate without some fur-
ther set of criteria to acertain which preferences or distributive out-
comes are desirable, and the adjudicator may turn to theories of 
autonomy and fairness to help her make this determination. 179 
IV. THE FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
The challenge for the adjudicator is to apply these paradigms to 
concrete cases. This requires an empirical assessment of the features 
of the transaction and the market in which the transaction occurs. 
Here I consider three exemplary cases that present problems for adju-
dicators' construction of hypothetical bargains. 
A. Contracts Among Shareholders in Close Corporations 
Recent developments in the law of close corporations pose particu-
larly difficult problems for the theory of hypothetical bargains. These 
178. In contrast, if transactors will bargain around the hypothetical contract imposed by 
adjudicators, the autonomy and fairness theorists should recognize by reference to their own 
goals that it is self-defeating to attempt to impose a different contract term by hypothetical 
bargain. 
179. As Richard Posner has argued, instrumental economic analysis (particularly what he 
calls "wealth maximization") does not provide a definitive normative standard for the legal sys-
tem in regulating transactions where diverse social values or ends are at stake. See R. POSNER, 
supra note 70, at 374-87; Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 
1668 (1990). Nonetheless, as Terry Fisher pointed out to me in discussing an earlier draft of this 
Article, even lawyers with a deep skepticism of a strictly economic or instrumental approach to 
legal problems find that, as a practical matter, the recommendation of an instrumental approach 
largely coincides with those of frameworks that begin with a conception of the right or a nonin-
strumental conception of the good. E.g., Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
HARV. L. REv. 1659 (1988); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments 011 the Ethi· 
cal Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967). 
In the context of hypothetical bargains, this convergence reflects at least two sociological 
aspects of instrumental theory as applied to contract law. First, in consensual transactions, per-
sons react to legal norms in various ways that create costs. Second, market transactions inevita-
bly contemplate a minimal common sense of instrumental purpose, without which bargains make 
no sense at all. Conversely, there remain large areas - involving preference formation and dis-
tribution of entitlements or goods where individuals lack information to bargain - where eco-
nomic reasoning must be supplemented by the fuller set of considerations outlined here. 
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difficulties reflect several features of transactions among close corpora-
tion participants, including the complexity of the relationship among 
participants over time (the large number of contingencies that arise, 
most of which cannot be dealt with explicitly in ex ante agreements), 
the diversity among participants in foresight and ability to bargain, 
and the high costs to enterprise of ex post judicial intervention. 
A recurrent problem in this context arises when the venturers 
make a decision that deprives one of the shareholders of what she per-
ceives to be her fair share of the gains from the enterprise. This may 
occur because the participant loses or leaves a job with the company 
that had provided as compensation a share in the company's profits.180 
Or active shareholders may deprive others of income by refusing to 
pay dividends181 or by diverting business opportunities to themselves. 
Or the shareholder may suffer by having his shares bought out at less 
than full value, either through fraud182 or exercise of majority power 
to put the shareholder in a position where he is desperate to sell. 183 
Because it is generally feasible for the small number of sharehold-
ers in a close corporation to bargain among themselves, one view of 
the appropriate hypothetical bargain - forcibly expounded by Easter-
brook and Fischel - would leave these questions to express contract. 
Hypothetical bargain will impose no obligation bargain, because the 
parties feasibly can expressly provide for whatever distribution of prof-
its and business advantages they believe to be appropriate. 184 
This approach distinguishes distributional rules from the basic fi-
duciary prohibitions against incompetence and theft. Although pre-
sumably shareholders might contract out of these in specific instances, 
it seems correct to assume that shareholders in close corporations 
would generally want basic fiduciary prohibitions in place, rather than 
having to build them into express contracts. On distributional ques-
tions, in contrast, managers and shareholders should be free to make 
whatever decisions they wish, as long as they comply with basic fiduci-
ary norms. 
In contrast, some jurisdictions have gone considerably farther, 185 
180. E.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976). 
181. Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 
12 Mass. App. Ct. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981). 
182. E.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 
U.S. 901 (1988). 
183. Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986). 
184. Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra note 6. The methodological assump-
tions made by Easterbrook and Fischel are discussed in supra section II.A. I. 
185. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 
(1976); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983). 
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protecting shareholders' legitimate or reasonable expectations in such 
matters as employment, dividends and distributions, and buy-outs. 
Express contract terms are not the only source of such judicially pro-
tected expectations; courts also look to more informal discussion or 
arrangements, past practices, and a general sense that participants 
have reason to expect a stable and equitably allocated flow of profits to 
themselves as income. 
The framework that I have developed suggests that this emergent 
judicial approach is preferable to the more austere set of background 
norms that Fischel and Easterbrook proposed. Occasions for opportu-
nistic distribution of gains from the enterprise arise in an enormous 
array of situations that may be difficult to anticipate via contract 
terms. Given the complexity of the requisite provisions, it would seem 
to be substantially cheaper to imply a strong set of background duties 
and permit individual transactors to draft opt out provisions. Further, 
many close corporation participants are ill-advised or unsophisticated 
and so may not anticipate such matters. Finally, a freeze-out may 
have very onerous financial consequences for the excluded share-
holder, whose livelihood or human capital is likely to be tied up with 
his opportunities to profit from participation in the enterprise. 
To be sure, it is not clear that the more protective judicial ap-
proach can be justified as efficient in a strict sense. The choice of a 
more protective hypothetical contract regime involves imposing costs 
of drafting opt out agreements on some transactors to protect other 
transactors who would not have the sophistication or good judgment 
to insist by contract on the protections that they automatically receive 
under a more protective regime.ts6 
186. One might justify a "Rawlsian" bargain among idealized close corporation participnnts 
in advance. As a practical matter, this idealization simply represents a judgment that courts 
should try to assure a fair distribution of benefits in close corporation cases, even if that increases 
drafting costs for other transactors. 
As noted in supra section II.A, the Rawlsian bargaining rigorously embodies efficiency con-
cerns when transactors advert to the risks of opportunism ex post. For example, if all close 
corporation shareholders rationally advert to the possibility of ex post redistributive behavior, 
but realize that they cannot contract against it because the contract provisions are too costly, 
then it reduces transactions costs for the courts to provide these terms. In particular, it facilitates 
close corporation arrangements that parties would otherwise not enter into because they feared 
that they would lose out from opportunism that they could not protect themselves against by 
contract. 
The argument seems not entirely plausible, however, because many shareholders may not 
have the sophistication to appreciate the risks that they would face. For that reason, their ex 
ante transactional behavior would not be affected by the background legal regime, and one can-
not say that, by providing a more protective regime, one facilitates transactions that otherwise 
would not go forward. 
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B. Contracts Between Doctors and Patients 
In regulating medical care, courts face the problem of determining 
the meaning or scope of therapeutic assurances that doctors give to 
patients.187 In Garcia v. von Micsky, 188 for example, plaintiff sought to 
enforce what she claimed was a promise, made to her by a physician 
after a tubal ligation and a subsequent examination of the patient, that 
she could no longer become pregnant. The court held that it was a 
mere "therapeutic reassurance":189 it was not to be interpreted as a 
promise that the woman would not get pregnant, and so did not give 
rise to legal liability. 
As Judge Oakes argues in dissent, a simple reconstruction of the 
doctor-patient interaction makes the court's decision seem questiona-
ble under standard rules of contract. The court's opinion reports: 
"Dr. Von Micsky entered the waiting room with Mrs. Garcia and, in 
the sister-in-law's hearing, told Mrs. Garcia 'that she had nothing to 
worry about, that it was impossible for her, you know, to have any 
more children and to try to relax and take it easy.' " 190 As Judge 
Oakes argues, the statement, accompanied by suitable evidence of sub-
stantial reliance, would seem to provide a classic case for invocation of 
promissory estoppel.191 
But the question of interpretation - whether promissory estoppel 
is to be invoked to impose liability upon the doctor - is not quite as 
clear as Judge Oakes' formulation would suggest. First, consider how 
the doctor and patient themselves might have understood their inter-
action. Promissory estoppel applies only to promises: it articulates the 
community conception that it is morally culpable to lead an individual 
into foreseeable reliance on the basis of one's commitment, and then to 
breach that commitment. So the interpretive question is whether the 
doctor's statement was a promise. 
The difficulty is that not all statements about the future are 
promises.192 "It's not going to rain today" does not give rise to prom-
issory estoppel liability if you are soaked through because you left 
187. Courts often face the question whether doctors' predictions or reassurances rise to the 
level of enforceable promises. For general discussion of courts' approaches, see Stephens v. 
Spiwak, 61 Mich. App. 647, 233 N.W.2d 124 (1975); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. 
Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1981), vacated, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982). 
188. 602 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1979). 
189. 602 F.2d at 53. 
190. 602 F.2d at 52. 
191. 602 F.2d at 53-54 (Oakes, J., dissenting). 
192. The promise has a perfonnative function that the simple prediction lacks. Cf. J. Aus-
TIN, Performative Utterances, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233 (2d ed. 1970). 
1874 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1815 
home without your umbrella. 193 But often the distinction is only in-
choate in the statement at the time it was made. As we try to deter-
mine whether Mrs. Garcia, or her physician, conceived of the 
reassurance as a promise, it becomes apparent that we often do not 
consider the nature of the statement until an event arises that may 
count as breach. From a moral point of view, the issue is whether the 
patient should have understood that there was some chance that this 
was mere reassurance that could be erroneous, rather than one that 
invoked the very powerful moral conventions that attach opprobrium 
to breach of a promise. The doctor could plausibly conceive of the 
statement as a mere reassurance - an apparently somewhat desperate 
attempt to get Mrs. Garcia through a very difficult emotional situation 
- while the patient, particularly given her apparent emotional diffi-
culties, might have understood a higher level of trust being invoked. It 
is such a breach of trust, which causes damage through invoked reli-
ance, that the law chooses to make actionable under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel. 
An instrumental approach to the interpretive problem would pro-
ceed by analyzing a very different set of considerations. From an in-
strumental point of view, there is no reason to make the semantic or 
hermeneutic distinction between promises and other statements at all; 
the problem of interpretation does not appear in that guise. Instead, 
the instrumental question - which generates an answer to our inter-
pretive problem - is which rule lays out optimal ground rules for 
transfer of information between doctors and patients: which maxi-
mizes net benefits from the doctor-patient relationship? Under this 
approach, all statements are analyzed simply for their value as 
information. 
In particular, the question in the case would focus on who should 
bear the risk that the doctor's communication to the patient would be 
misunderstood. The background rule for the doctor-patient relation-
ship is the tort rule of negligence: the doctor is liable for unreasonably 
caused harms to the patient. We take the negligence rule as efficient 
- as do courts that have analyzed the problem194 and assume, as 
well, that there is no allegation (as there was not) that the doctor's 
statement to the patient was negligent in the sense of constituting mal-
practice. In that case, the effect of the patient's theory of recovery is 
193. The distinction is one that we learn quite young. Children seem to perceive fairly early 
that the claim - "but Daddy, you promised" - is one that at least puts Daddy on the defensive 
by suggesting a culpable breach of trust; and so the wise parent inculcates the distinction between 
promise and prediction, if only to maintain his or her own freedom of action and sanity. 
194. A useful statement of the characteristic approach to physicians' promises is Gault v. 
Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 100-02, 191 N.E.2d 436, 441-43 (1963). 
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to transmute the rule of negligence into a rule of strict liability for any 
case in which the doctor's statement misinforms the patient of the 
probability of some future conduct on the patient's part. But there is 
no reason to think that the strict liability rule would be efficient for 
this type of physician conduct, if the negligence rule is efficient every-
where else. One would conclude, then, that the patient's theory 
should fail. We should not treat physicians' assurances as promises, in 
other words, because the instrumental effect of such an interpretation 
would be an undesirable shift in the standard of liability from negli-
gence to strict liability in tort. 
In the Garcia situation, doctors advert to legal standard quite ex-
plicitly in their decisions about medical treatment, including the types 
of commitments to be made to patients. To the extent permitted by 
law, a rational doctor would obtain a disclaimer against liability under 
a rule that held therapeutic assurances to be an enforceable contract. 
In any event, by hypothesis, a holding of liability will not change phy-
sicians' conduct, as reassurance is not negligent. At best, then, imposi-
tion of liability would function as a type of compulsory insurance 
policy, distributing among patients as a group the costs of accidents 
such as that suffered by the plaintiff in Garcia. 
C. Contracts in Intimate Nonmarital Relationships 
Ca"oll v. Lee 195 posed the question whether the parties, two un-
married persons living together, had reached "an implied partnership 
or joint enterprise agreement" to acquire jointly certain property. 
Under the court's reading of the partnership agreement, "Judy,"196 
who was trained as a darkroom technician, agreed to stay home and 
keep house while "Paul" worked as a mechanic in an auto repair shop. 
In construing the agreement, the court gave decisive weight to this 
testimony by Judy: 
Q: What type of an arrangement, if any, did you and Paul discuss about 
what he expected from your relationship in terms of your contribution? 
A: We didn't really discuss it It just was there. He went to work. I 
stayed home and kept the house and, mostly because that's what he 
wanted me to do. 
Q: He told you that's what he wanted you to do; didn't he? 
A: Oh, yeah. 
195. 148 Ariz. 10, 14, 712 P.2d 923, 927 (1986). For a survey and comparative analysis of 
developments in this area of law, see M. GLENDON, THE 'IRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 
277-84 (1989). 
196. The court refers to the plaintiff and defendant as "Judy" and "Paul" throughout its 
opinion. 
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Q: And that, that included all the things that I went through with him, 
such as taking care of the laundry -
A: Uh-huh, of course. 
Q: - doing the dishes -
A: Yes. 
Q: - cleaning the house -
A: Yes.197 
From this (and confirming evidence from Paul about the facts of 
the domestic relationship), the court concluded that "the trial court 
could find the existence of an agreement for property to be acquired 
and owned jointly .... [W]e find a valid implied contract to combine 
efforts and jointly accumulate certain property .... "19s 
The method of interpretation here diverges sharply from that in 
cases like Garcia. Here there is no question but that legal consequence 
attaches to the reconstruction of the parties' actual understandings, as 
imagined or inferred from the court based on the circumstances of 
their relationship. The expectation that Judy would share jointly in 
accumulated property is transmuted directly into a legal claim. 
An alternative approach to the case would have adverted, as courts 
do in a cases like Garcia, to an instrumental construction of interpre-
tive convention. The empirical considerations are parallel to those of 
the doctor-patient relationship. Again, the intimacy of the relation-
ship may lead to numerous statements or assurances that could be 
construed as enforceable promises or warranties. The opportunity for 
perjured or innocently distorted recollection may tempt litigants. 
Public policy has provided an alternative set of regulatory structures 
for regulating similar claims: here, the institution of marriage (and, in 
some jurisdictions, common law marriage), as well as the formalities 
concerning acquisition, gift, and disposition of property. On these 
grounds, some jurisdictions have insisted on a more formalized dem-
onstration of agreement.199 
In Lee the interpretive strategy of imaginative reconstruction can 
be justified on several grounds. Most important, decisions like Lee 
may help to change social attitudes about duties of men and women 
living in intimate relationships. The process of imagined reconstruc-
tion enables courts to face, explicitly or implicitly, the question of em-
powerment: how much to idealize the imagined bargain to an 
approximation of ideal speech situation of full lucidity, access to rele-
vant information, and equal freedom to assert claims (equal bargaining 
197. 148 Ariz. at 15, 712 P.2d at 928. 
198. 148 Ariz. at 15-16, 712 P.2d at 928-29. 
199. See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 
(1980). 
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power). Often, the woman or, more generally, the domestic partner 
would have grave self-doubts and only the most tenuous hope of es-
caping with some shred of financial and personal integrity. And the 
reluctance to ask for any sort of commitment in writing, or to consum-
mate a marriage, may be a symptom of doubts about the strength or 
durability of the relationship or the reliability of the purported 
promises. The agreement that Judy successfully argues for in Lee may 
not be "just there." In these circumstances, to approximate a bargain 
that included these psychological con~ingencies would be to perpetu-
ate or reenact what many would condemn as the unjust distribution of 
power among men and women, or the roles traditionally associated 
with them, in our society. 
It is equally important to note, however, that the implicit paternal-
ism of this approach will not be self-defeating to the extent that such 
decisions can change persons' attitudes or at least obtain their acquies-
cence. The judicial standard of fair conduct may be one that persons 
will defer to, at least if it is within a socially acceptable range. Men 
may be reluctant to insist on bargains that circumvent legal rules re-
garding distribution of property, or they may fail to do so simply be-
cause of the costs of fully adverting to the legal rule. 200 
CONCLUSION 
Courts generally interpret contracts - resolve ambiguities and fill 
in missing terms - by asking what the parties would have agreed to 
had they explicitly addressed the issue before the court. But this hy-
pothetical bargain formulation conceals a complex set of issues. 
I have developed here an alternative approach to the problem of 
interpretation: 
(1) The interpreter must first determine whether subsequent trans-
actors will be in a position to bargain around the interpretation that it 
will proffer. This is a crucial yet generally ignored first step to choos-
ing the method of interpretation. 
(2) If transactors will be in a position to bargain around the court's 
interpretation, then the court should interpret by a strictly instrumen-
tal calculation. It should choose the interpretation that will minimize 
prospective bargaining costs. As section III.Chas explained, this does 
not mean choosing what most bargainers would want, or choosing 
200. To the extent that men incompletely bargain to nullify the rule, the effect would be to 
redistribute from men to women. (It would provide the mirror image of the California rules for 
distribution on no-fault divorce, which have enriched men and impoverished women. See L. 
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND EcONOMIC CoNSE-
QUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 20-32, 357-66 (1985)). 
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what the parties before the court would have wanted; nor should the 
court make any attempt to correct what they believe to be mistakes 
made by transactors. Rather, the court should choose the interpreta-
tion that will induce parties to expend the least effort in bargaining 
around the court's interpretation. 
(3) If some future transactors would not bargain around the court's 
interpretation, then the court faces a more complex inquiry. The 
court should consider the costs that future parties will incur in bar-
gaining around the rule. But the court must also consider three other 
factors. 
First, it should consider which interpretation would be desirable 
for the parties who will simply accept whatever interpretation the 
court now adopts. In this inquiry, the court should consider all of the 
consequences of alternative rules, and may decide to advance values or 
goals different from those that the transactors would choose for them-
selves. Second, the court should keep in mind that different interpre-
tations may impose costs on different classes of transactors. The court 
then should consider which distribution of costs is most desirable. 
Third, the court may find that enforcing a proposed interpretation 
may modify transactors' understandings or preferences in a way that 
the court believes to be socially desirable. That finding would provide 
a reason to adopt the interpretation, even though it does not corre-
spond to what the parties would now explicitly bargain for. 
In short, careful analysis requires that courts adopt the simple hy-
pothetical bargain conception in a number of important respects. 
Courts that pursue a more naive conception - most often, simply fo-
cusing on the intent of the parties before the court - will often adopt 
interpretations that are neither fair nor efficient. The conception of 
the hypothetical bargain is no more than a misleading metaphor unless 
it is understood in terms of the type of analysis advocated here. 
Aside from the important task of achieving conceptual clarity, the 
analysis proposed here has, as we have seen, practical implications for 
courts' approach to particular types of contracts. Cases will often in-
volve situations in which a simplistic notion of hypothetical bargain 
leads to incorrect results.201 For example, in many corporate contexts, 
courts should adopt a rule different from the one that parties would 
opt for. With complex contracts it is much more expensive to draft a 
detailed, complicated set of terms than to opt out of them, once the 
201. Indeed, this is the prediction of litigation models that propose that parties will litigate 
cases where the rule is inefficient. To the extent that the analysis here has identified modes of 
interpretation that are inefficient, these theories would predict that litigation frequently involves 
the types of transactions where inefficient modes of analysis are used. 
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law has put them in place. The opt out can foreclose an area of law 
from application, or it can identify particular exceptions that leave in 
place a large number of other rules for other situations. In both in-
stances, it is easier to draft the opt out than the entire body of rules. 
Much of corporate law and the law of complex or relational contracts 
is cqaracterized by this asymmetry. 
Also, in a large number of transactions, parties will not bargain 
around whatever rule the courts put in place: either they will simply 
defer to the rule, having no preference against it; or, in some instances, 
application of the rule will persuade parties that it is correct; or parties 
will defer to the legal decisionmaker who they believe to be better in-
formed than the parties themselves; or bargaining costs for alternative 
rules may simply be too high. Thus, in these cases, "what the parties 
would have done" - the hypothetical bargain - should exert no au-
thority on courts whatever. In large areas of the law, where parties 
are naive or where social norms are in flux, the usual notion is concep-
tually not in play. 
